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Abstract 
This report provides an overview of the potential contribution of economic experiments to the Common Agricultural Policy 
evaluation toolbox. The methodology of economic experiments is briefly described in chapter 2. Chapter 3 presents examples of 
experimental studies relevant for the analysis of the Common Agricultural Policy. Chapter 4 discusses whether there is room for 
economic experiments in the EU evaluation toolbox. Chapter 5 identifies the main challenges when implementing economic 
experiments. Chapter 6 provides a set of recommendations, arising from the discussions between the authors of this report and 
policy officers from DG AGRI, relative to the introduction of economic experiments in the CAP evaluation toolbox.  
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Executive summary 
The last two decades have seen a rapidly 
growing interest in the use of experiments 
to analyse, test and evaluate policies, both 
at national and European level. In the 
European Commission (EC), several DGs 
have already commissioned experimental 
studies in the fields of consumption, health, 
employment and the environment. 
Compared to these other fields, the use of 
experimental methods for evaluating the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has 
remained very limited up to now.  
This report provides an overview of the 
potential contribution of economic 
experiments to Common Agricultural 
Policy evaluation.  
Along the report, “evaluation” is used in a 
broad sense, including both ex-ante (impact 
assessment in EC terminology) and ex-post 
evaluation (evaluation in EC terminology). 
This report follows up on the presentations 
and discussions at the workshop “How can 
economic experiments inform EU 
agricultural policy?”, organised by the Joint 
Research Centre and held on 8 January 
2015 at DG AGRI of the European 
Commission, Brussels.  
What are economic experiments? 
Experiments are procedures where 
economic questions are studied by making 
participants go through a particular exercise 
or “game”, designed to capture the decision 
situation under study. The data collected in 
such experiments can for example be used 
to test economic theories, to reveal 
economic decision making in the presence 
of policies, and to reveal market 
mechanisms. Experiments can be conducted 
in the laboratory, in the field or online, but 
the experimental data generation process 
always involves two main features: 
First, participants in an experiment are 
randomly allocated to a treatment group, 
designed to represent the policy under 
evaluation, or a control group, representing 
the current policy or status-quo. 
Second, participants are usually incentivised 
to reveal their true preferences: they 
receive a payment according to their 
decisions in the experiment. 
These general characteristics hide a large 
variety in economic experiments. In the 
report, we classify experimental approaches 
in four categories: discrete choice 
experiments (DCE), laboratory experiments, 
field experiments and randomised control 
trials (RCTs). 
Is there room for economic 
experiments in the EU agricultural 
policy evaluation toolbox? 
The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has 
experienced several reforms over the last 
decades. In order to meet the CAP’s 
evolving objectives, the type of policy 
interventions has changed drastically. As a 
result, also the toolbox for evaluating these 
policies needs to be constantly adapted to 
follow these policy changes.  
The CAP toolbox for ex-ante policy 
assessment and ex-post evaluation studies 
includes: farm and market simulation 
models, calibrated with EU-wide statistical 
data (e.g. FADN or FSS), statistical and 
econometric analysis of survey data and a 
range of qualitative methods such as 
interviews with stakeholders, focus group or 
internet-based public consultation (EC 
2015). 
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Recent evolutions in the CAP call for 
evaluation methods able to: (1) capture the 
change in support target, from commodities 
to farm holding, therefore using the farm 
holding as the main unit of policy 
evaluation; (2) account for the voluntary 
aspects of many measures, (3) allow the 
evaluation of purely regulatory measures 
(with no EU funding involved) and (4) 
flexible enough to account for the 
heterogeneity in CAP implementation due to 
the greater flexibility given to Member 
States for implementing first and second-
pillar measures. 
In this context, economic experiments can 
be a useful addition to the CAP evaluation 
toolbox in three directions:  
First, experiments are particularly well 
suited to shed light on the behavioural 
drivers of farmers’ responses to policy. In 
that direction, experimental data can be 
combined with non-experimental evaluation 
tools. For example, experiments allow the 
elicitation of behavioural parameters (e.g. 
risk aversion, time preferences) which can 
then be included in simulation models. Also, 
they can reveal information to test whether 
other types of objectives functions would 
reflect better farmers’ preferences. 
Second, experimental approaches allow 
testing different variations in policies prior 
to implementation in order to compare their 
effectiveness and/or efficiency. Especially 
when moving to new types of policies, 
simulation or econometric models based on 
data observed in the past will do a poor job 
in predicting farmers’ reactions to a new 
policy. When it comes to targeted policy 
interventions (on specific farm types or in a 
limited number of regions), simulation 
models are not the most appropriate 
method either, given the cost of making the 
models flexible enough to capture policy 
specificities at the regional or farm level 
and because of the lack of data to feed 
such models. 
Third, economic experiments, especially 
RCTs, can contribute to ex-post policy 
evaluation, by providing clean information 
on the counterfactual situation. Thanks to 
the high control in the data collection 
process, experimental approaches allow to 
measure the net impact of the policy and to 
distinguish it from other factors, which is 
not always possible with methods based on 
observational data. But RCTs provide limited 
insights on the reasons behind the observed 
effects. 
Following the Introduction (chapter 1) and 
an overview of economic experiments for 
policy evaluation (chapter 2), chapter 3 
reviews the most noteworthy applications 
of economic experiments already available 
in the literature and likely to inform EU 
agricultural policy-makers. This chapter 
provides an illustration of the possibilities 
of the different types of experimental 
approaches to evaluate agricultural policies. 
Complementarities between experimental 
and non-experimental methods are further 
discussed in chapter 4. More precisely, 
experimental approaches are compared to 
other evaluation methods in the light of the 
trade-off between “internal validity” (i.e. the 
ability to identify the causal relation 
between two variables, for example the 
policy and the outcome) and “external 
validity” (i.e. the ability to transfer the 
results to the real world and to other 
contexts). In lab experiments, internal 
validity is guaranteed by the high level of 
control of the decision-making environment 
and random assignment of participants to 
the different treatments, which allows 
preventing systematic differences in 
treatment and control groups. However, the 
ability to transfer the results to the real 
world could be an important limitation of 
lab experiments. Field experiments, RCTs 
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and DCEs present a compromise and can 
lessen the inherent tension between 
establishing causality and guaranteeing the 
generalizability of results.  
The different methods are also compared 
with respect to their practical 
implementation, such as the ease of data 
collection, and the ease of interpretation of 
evaluation results by policy makers. 
Main practical issues associated with 
the setting-up of experiments  
The first difficulty concerns the recruitment 
of participants. The fact that many types of 
experiments cannot be organised via the 
internet or at the respondents’ home 
creates extra difficulties compared to 
traditional surveys. As a result, sample size 
may be limited and/or the risk of selection 
bias increased, and this will often call for 
compromise in the search for sample 
“representativeness”. 
Second, when the experimental approach 
requires setting up sub-groups receiving 
different treatments, particular attention 
must be paid to the procedure assigning 
participants to treatment and control 
groups.  
Third, randomisation can raise ethical 
concerns since it may create inequities 
across participants. “Close to random” 
procedures are described. They can be used 
to introduce some randomisation elements 
in experiments (thereby reducing selection 
bias) while increasing acceptance compared 
to pure randomisation. 
While experiments generally provide more 
robust evidence than traditional surveys or 
stakeholder consultation, strategic biases 
can still be observed. Such strategic bias 
arises when participants anticipate that 
their responses or observed behaviour will 
have an impact on future policy choices and 
may want to manipulate the outcomes of 
the experiment by adopting an insincere 
behaviour. Such bias must be controlled by 
a careful design of the experimental 
protocol.  
Finally, identification and recruitment of 
participants impose organisational 
constraints, which in turn induce costs. The 
costs depend on the scope of the study and 
the type of experimental design. As a 
general rule of thumb, laboratory 
experiments can be expected to be cheaper 
and yield more rapid results than field 
experiments and DCEs, whereas RCTs often 
involve the most costly and time-consuming 
set-up. 
The incorporation of experimental 
approaches in the current CAP evaluation 
toolbox may not be straightforward. A list 
of six recommendations, that have 
benefitted of comments by selected DG 
AGRI policy officers (see Acknowledgments), 
is provided to enhance the use of 
experimental approaches in the CAP 
evaluation process. 
Recommendations to evaluators when 
proposing the use of experiments for 
CAP analysis 
1. Make use of the complementarity of 
methodologies and be open to the use of 
innovative methods  
Policy officers are fully aware of the need 
for the toolbox to evolve. Take advantage of 
the absence of constraints in the 
methodology in most calls for tenders to 
propose innovative methods, including 
experimental approaches. The 
complementarities between economic 
experiment and non-experimental 
approaches are numerous and should be 
highlighted.  
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2. Reconsider the search for 
“representativeness” 
Policy officers generally look for evidence 
general enough to be valid for the entire 
population under study. However, given the 
limitations in sample size and the sampling 
issues involved in experimental studies, this 
will not always be possible. The 
representativeness and generalizability of 
the results should be discussed in detail to 
avoid misunderstanding. Repeating 
experiments in a number of different 
contexts (different regions, farm types) can 
also increase the robustness and 
acceptability of experimental results by 
policy officers. 
3. Proceed by incremental steps: from the 
laboratory to the field. 
Different types of experiments can 
complement each other. For example, new 
policies could be first tested in the lab and 
then in the field, before moving to 
randomised control trials. 
4. Make sure experiments are implemented in 
a non-discriminatory way. 
It is crucial that any EU action is 
implemented in a non-discriminatory way. 
Also when making use of experiments, one 
should make sure to respect this principle. 
Innovative approaches to randomisation 
and close-to-random procedures may 
provide a solution. 
Recommendations to EC policy officers 
to enhance the use of experiments  
1. Invest in resources and expertise on the use 
of experimental methods for policy 
evaluation 
With respect to the development of policy 
proposals and their ex-ante impact 
evaluation, investing in internal (EC) 
expertise on the use of experimental 
methods would allow spreading their use to 
inform policy making. One example is the 
newly created ‘Unit for Scientific Foresight 
and Behavioural Insight’ of the Joint 
Research Centre of the EC. 
DG AGRI can also make use of the 
Framework Contract for the Provision of 
Behavioural Studies to commission 
experiments on the behavioural aspects of 
farmers’ policy responses.  
2. Inform evaluators on the potential of 
experimental approaches and openness 
towards the use of these new methods 
Informing external contractors on the 
advantages and limitations of experimental 
approaches for policy making could help to 
show DG AGRI’s openness towards the use 
of these methods in future evaluation 
contracts. Also Member States could be 
informed on the potential of experimental 
approaches, for example with respect to the 
evaluation of nationally implemented rural 
development policies. 
Moreover, informing evaluators on the 
procedure for authorisation of pilot tests 
and randomisation by the EC services would 
allow evaluators to take into account the 
constraints associated to these procedures 
and may encourage the setting-up of RCTs.  
 
   
 10 
 
1  Introduction 
European policies are constantly analysed, 
monitored and evaluated, allowing their 
adjustment or reform on the basis of sound 
evidence. The need for policy evaluation 
arises both before and after policy 
implementation (Figure 1).  
The methodological toolbox for policy 
evaluation has made several important 
advances in the last decades. First, new 
tools for identifying the causal impact of 
policies have been developed, including 
both experimental and quasi-experimental 
approaches (EC 2013a). Second, 
behavioural studies have shed light on the 
need to account for many elements of the 
decision context, beyond simple profit 
maximisation, in order to predict economic 
agents' responses to different policy 
instruments. 
In this report, we investigate how such 
advances can be further integrated into the 
evaluation toolbox of the European 
Commission (EC). More precisely, we focus 
on the relevance of experimental methods 
for the evaluation of the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) and their potential 
contribution to evidence-based agricultural 
policy making (see box 1 for a clarification 
on terminology). 
In agriculture, experiments have been used 
for a long time. Field trials are widely used 
by agronomists to measure differences in 
agricultural productivity of different 
practices (Splawa-Neyman 1923 [traduced 
in 1990]; Fisher 1926). Economic 
experiments attempt to apply the same 
principles to human participants and their 
economic decisions. But the usefulness of 
experiments in economic research and 
policy analysis was initially thought to be 
limited, because of the difficulty of 
controlling the wide range of factors that 
influence human decision making.  
 Economists cannot perform the 
controlled experiments of chemists or 
biologists because [they] cannot easily 
control other important factors. Like 
astronomers or meteorologists, 
[economists] generally must be content 
largely to observe  (Samuelson and 
Nordhaus 1985). 
Yet, experimental methods have been 
further developed to observe and analyse 
the behaviour of economic agents under 
controlled institutional environments and to 
inform policy makers about the impacts of 
current and proposed policy alternatives 
(Kagel and Roth 1995). As a result, the last 
two decades have seen a rapidly growing 
interest in the use of experiments to test 
and evaluate policies, both at national and 
EU level.  
 11 
 
• Measure net impacts of policy 
• Understand outcomes and draw 
conclusions 
• Communicate on policy 
• Prepare next policy cycle 
Ex ante 
evaluation 
CONCEPTION 
AND 
IMPLEMENTATION END 
Ex post 
evaluation 
Ex ante 
evaluation 
CONCEPTION 
• Compare different policy designs 
• Anticipate reactions to policy 
• Anticipate costs and benefits  
• Evaluate feasibility 
• Explain and convince 
New policy  
Box 1: Terminology used in the report 
Throughout this report, “evaluation” is used in a broad sense, including both ex-ante 
(impact assessment in EC terminology) and ex-post evaluation (evaluation in EC 
terminology). 
Ex ante evaluation contributes to the choice of the most efficient or cost-effective policies 
among different options. For example, the European Commission performs an Impact 
Assessment for all initiatives that are likely to have significant economic, environmental 
and social impacts, consisting of a careful analysis of the potential impacts of different 
policy scenarios before a policy proposal is made (EC 2015). 
Ex post, it is important to know if the policy has reached the expected targets or not, and to 
identify the reasons for success or failure. In the EU, the CAP is evaluated regularly through 
evaluations targeted at specific measures and based on the implementation of the policy 
over the last years.  
While this distinction between ex ante and ex post is useful for evaluators and researchers 
who need to select the most appropriate methodology, this distinction may be less 
straightforward in practice given that time is continuous and policy implemented at time t 
also serves as input for ex ante evaluation of the next policy at time t+1. 
Figure 1: The policy evaluation cycle (Source: Authors’ own elaboration)
In the European Commission, several 
Directorates-General (DGs) have already 
commissioned experimental studies to 
analyse the impact of policies in the fields 
of consumption, health, employment or the 
environment (Ciriolo 2011; van Bavel, 
Rodríguez-Priego, and Maghiros 2015). 
Compared to these other fields, the use of 
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experimental methods for evaluating the 
CAP has remained very limited up to now.1  
Could the experimental approach be 
therefore a relevant addition to the CAP 
evaluation toolbox? 
Experimental methods are useful only if 
they can complement other evaluation 
methodologies. There are already many 
powerful methods for agricultural policy 
evaluation in Europe, such as the analysis 
of high-quality agricultural statistics (FADN, 
Eurostat Farm Structure Survey), qualitative 
case-study approaches, and several 
economic models representing the farming 
sector, both at market and farm levels. 
Therefore, the focus of experimental 
studies should be on how they can add 
robust evidence to the existing impact 
assessment and evaluation process 
(Rodríguez-Priego and van Bavel 2014). 
This report follows up on the presentations 
and discussions at the workshop “How can 
economic experiments inform EU 
agricultural policy?”, held on 8 January 
2015, organised by the Joint Research 
Centre and housed by DG Agriculture and 
Rural Development of the European 
Commission, Brussels. The objective of the 
workshop was twofold: i) to introduce DG 
AGRI staff to economic experiments as a 
tool for agricultural policy design and 
evaluation; ii) to discuss how economic 
experiments can complement existing CAP 
evaluation methods. The agenda for the 
meeting and list of participants are 
presented in Annex 1. 
                                              
1
 In an article entitled “Can field experiments return 
agricultural economics to the glory days?”, Herberich, 
et al. (2009) speculate that the future of field 
experimental methods can be importantly 
engineered by agricultural and resource economists. 
The methodology of economic experiments 
is briefly described in chapter 2. Chapter 3 
presents examples of experimental studies 
relevant for the analysis of the Common 
Agricultural Policy. Chapter 4 discusses 
whether there is room for economic 
experiments in the EU evaluation toolbox. 
Chapter 5 identifies the main challenges 
when implementing economic experiments. 
Chapter 6 provides a set of 
recommendations, arising from the 
discussions between the authors of this 
report and policy officers from DG AGRI, 
relative to the introduction of economic 
experiments in the CAP evaluation toolbox. 
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2 Economic experiments for 
policy evaluation: an overview 
 
2.1 Definition and classification 
of experimental approaches 
Economic experiments are procedures 
whereby participants are made to go 
through a particular exercise or “game”, 
designed to capture the situation under 
study (van Bavel, Rodríguez-Priego, and 
Maghiros 2015). The data collected in such 
experiments can for example be used to 
test economic theories, to reveal economic 
decision making in the presence of policies, 
and to reveal market mechanisms. 
Experiments are either conducted in the 
laboratory, in the field or online. 
Experiments consist in data generation 
rather than the collection of observational 
(or “naturally occurring") data (Herberich et 
al. 2009). This data generation process is 
controlled by the analyst and often includes 
two main features: 
First, participants in an experiment are in 
most cases randomly allocated to one of 
the treatment groups, designed to represent 
the policies or instruments under 
evaluation, or a control group, representing 
the current policy or status-quo. Their 
behaviour is then observed and compared 
to that of participants exposed to different 
interventions (or to nothing, i.e. the control 
group).  
Second, participants are affected by the 
decisions they make in the experiment: they 
usually receive a payment according to their 
decisions in the experiment. The incentives 
are not just for showing up. Rather, they 
guarantee that participants take their tasks 
seriously and thereby emulate real-life 
behaviour as much as possible (van Bavel, 
Rodríguez-Priego, and Maghiros 2015). 
Ideally, the magnitude of the financial 
incentives in the experiment should be close 
to those in the real world to ensure that 
participants’ decisions in the experiment 
correspond to those in real life.2 Decisions 
are therefore less biased by strategic 
responses compared to answers to 
hypothetical questions. An experimental 
design is said to be incentive-compatible if 
all of the participants fare best when they 
truthfully reveal their preferences. When 
such mechanisms are used, experiments 
are classified as revealed preferences 
approaches.3 
These general characteristics hide a large 
variety in economic experiments described 
below. 
2.1.1 Discrete choice experiments 
DCEs are used for assessing people’s 
preferences and/or decisions in hypothetical 
situations, e.g. before a new product is 
launched, a new technology becomes 
available, or a new policy is implemented. 
                                              
2
 One limit of the experimental approaches is the 
difficulty to replicate ‘real losses’. In very few 
experiments participants can incur losses beyond the 
dotation which may be given in the experiment. 
3
 Revealed preferences oppose to stated preferences, 
where agents are asked to declare their preferences 
in a hypothetical setting.   
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DCE are designed such that it is possible for 
the respondent to envisage the different 
situations in the real world even when they 
do not exist yet. 
A DCE consists of several rounds. In each 
round, respondents are presented with a 
‘choice set’ of alternatives, and are asked to 
indicate their preferred option. Typically 
each alternative consists of a combination 
of characteristics, called ‘attributes’, one of 
which is a price (cost) or a payment 
(benefit). Hence, when making their choice, 
respondents have to trade-off between the 
lower monetary benefit or higher cost of 
one alternative, and the more preferable 
non-monetary characteristics of another 
alternative. The results of these repeated 
choices allow estimating in monetary terms 
the value of each attribute for the 
participants. Or, more specifically, what 
their willingness-to-pay (WTP) or 
willingness-to-accept (WTA) is for changes 
in the level of each attribute.  
A DCE can thus provide estimates of 
welfare gains or losses: for instance, it can 
provide an estimate of the value the public 
places on an improvement or deterioration 
in a specific element of their environment, 
or the costs incurred by farmers for 
adopting a set of environmentally friendly 
land management practices. Well-designed 
DCE usually involve context-specific lists of 
attributes and values for these attributes. 
As a result, these estimates can usually not 
be generalised to other contexts or 
populations.  
Unlike all other experimental methods 
presented here, DCE is usually a stated-
preference method4: respondents are asked 
                                              
4
 Real discrete choice experiments, where discrete 
choice questions are combined with real economic 
incentives, are developing fast to analyze consumers’ 
preferences and willingness to pay for new products 
to choose amongst hypothetical scenarios 
and do not receive incentive payments for 
their responses. Thus, it may be that these 
‘stated’ preferences do not correspond with 
their ‘revealed preferences’, i.e. the choices 
they would effectively make in real life.  
Nevertheless, DCEs present several 
advantages over alternative formats of 
contingent evaluation methods such as 
open-ended questions (which also provide 
only stated preferences). Indeed, DCE are a 
more sophisticated method which reduces 
bias in responses by making it more 
difficult for the respondent to respond 
strategically.  
2.1.2 Lab experiments 
Lab experiments take place in a laboratory, 
often a computer room, where participants 
are invited to take part in an exercise or 
game which aims to test economic 
behaviour in response to a set of different 
scenarios. 5  Participants are financially 
incentivised to mimic real-world incentives: 
they can win or lose money according to 
their decisions in the experiment and are 
paid in accordance to their choices or 
performance at the end of the experiment. 
Participants are confronted with choices 
that are usually formulated in an abstract 
way. Such a decontextualized setting allows 
the experimenter to ensure that the results 
of the experiment are not influenced by the 
way the game is framed. 
                                                                     
(Lusk and Schroeder, 2004; Alfnes et al., 2006; 
Michaud et al., 2012; Ginon et al., 2014). However, 
they are more difficult to set-up when the choice 
under study is a policy option rather than a 
consumption good. 
5
 A video presenting lab experiments produced for 
the workshop is available at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XuJ-cu32z3k 
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Laboratory experiments are used to pre-test 
new instruments or policy designs. Different 
treatments of a lab experiment allow 
comparing several policy options: for 
example, how behaviour changes when the 
implementation rules of a policy are 
changed, or when participants are allowed 
to communicate or cooperate before taking 
their decision, and whether providing 
different information sets affects 
participants’ decisions. 
Thanks to randomisation of participants to 
alternative treatments, and the high control 
over the decision context in the lab, lab 
experiments are valued for their almost 
clinical ability to isolate interventions and 
measure their actual impact on behaviour, 
beyond simply establishing correlations 
(van Bavel, Rodríguez-Priego, and Maghiros 
2015). 
Most lab experiments are conducted with 
students. When real stakeholders from the 
field are recruited as participants, this is 
referred to as an artefactual field 
experiment in the literature (Harrison and 
List 2004). 
2.1.3 Field experiments 
While lab experiments have been used 
more widely - partly because they are easy 
to implement, not very expensive, and 
students are easy to recruit - field 
experiments have recently gained popularity 
in the domain of (agricultural) economics 
(Herberich et al. 2009). 
While lab experiments allow for a perfect 
control of the decision environment, the 
artificial context of lab experiments may 
result in behaviour that is poorly correlated 
with naturally occurring behaviour. As such, 
for analysing certain topics, lab experiments 
may be of little relevance for predicting 
behaviour in the field (Harrison and List 
2004). When the context is believed to 
impact on participants’ decision making, one 
may prefer to move towards a more 
realistic ‘field’ setting, where the experiment 
is designed such as to represent as closely 
as possible the field context and the policy 
to be assessed. This is referred to in the 
literature as a framed field experiment. 6 In 
such experiments the commodity used, the 
terminology, the task to be executed or 
information set that the participants use, 
correspond to the real environment in which 
the task or policy takes place.  
2.1.4 Randomized Controlled Trials  
A last class of experiments are the 
Randomised Controlled Trials (RCT), 
sometimes also referred to as ‘Randomised 
Field Trials’ (Burtless 1995). The RCT 
methodology has been developed and 
progressed in clinical research. Its diffusion 
into the social sciences and, in particular, 
economics has been slow, but in recent 
years economic RCTs have become more 
frequently used, especially in the fields of 
labour and development economics.  
An RCT is a study design that randomly 
assigns participants to a treatment group or 
                                              
6
 Following the classification proposed by Harrison 
and List (2004). They also include natural field 
experiments in their classification of field 
experiments, which they refer to as “a framed field 
experiment that takes place in the environment 
where the participants naturally undertake these 
tasks and where the participants do not know they 
are taking part in an experiment”. In this report, our 
field experiments category only refers to experiments 
in which subjects play ‘games’ (with or without 
interactions with other subjects) and get paid 
according to their decisions but their participation 
does not have any consequences in their real life. 
Hence, they always know they are taking part in an 
experiment. We instead consider natural field 
experiments to be closer to randomized controlled 
trials, which are discussed as a separate category 
(2.1.4).  
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a control group, where the treatment 
consists of the real implementation of a 
policy or programme. Hence, participants 
are not asked to act as if they would face a 
certain policy, or are not asked to play a 
game with financial incentives. Instead, an 
RCT actually implements the policy among 
a group of randomly selected ‘true’ 
stakeholders. It then observes the actual 
behaviour of the participants under this 
policy and compares it to a group of 
comparable participants that did not receive 
the policy treatment.  
Random allocation means that all 
participants have the same chance of being 
assigned to either the treatment or the 
control group. The purpose of random 
allocation of participants is to assure that, 
before the start of the intervention (also 
called the baseline), participants in both 
groups have the same characteristics. As 
such, any observed group differences at the 
end of the study cannot be due to 
differences in the average person in each 
group, for the assignment process renders 
such differences unlikely. Random 
assignment provides the best 
counterfactual describing what would have 
happened to treatment group participants 
had they not been exposed to the treatment 
(Cook, 2003). 
For a more comprehensive description of 
the RCT methodology, the reader is referred 
to Duflo, Glennester & Kremer (2007).  
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Table 1: Classification of economic experiments 
 Participants 
Nature of the 
participants’ pool  
Context 
Nature of the task or institutional rules applied, and the environment 
that the participants operate in. 
Incentive mechanism 
The mechanism used to allow the 
revelation of preferences.  
Discrete Choice 
experiments 
Participants drawn 
from the population of 
interest (e.g. farmers) 
Respondents are presented with different choice cards and, in each 
choice card, they have to select their preferred option among 
different contextualised scenarios or alternatives 
No incentive mechanism in 
hypothetical DCE. In non-
hypothetical DCE, participants bear 
the financial consequences of their 
choice.  
Laboratory 
experiments  
Students  The context is artificial or synthetic in certain dimensions 
(decontextualised experiment). 
Payments according to choices or 
performance in the experiment 
Field 
experiment 
Participants drawn 
from the population of 
interest (e.g. farmers) 
In artefactual field experiments, the context is artificial or synthetic in 
certain dimensions, as in lab experiments.  
Framed field experiments are framed in the field context of the 
commodity, task, stakes, or information set of the participants 
(contextualised experiment). 
Payments according to choices or 
performance in the experiment 
Randomised 
Control Trial 
Participants drawn 
from the population of 
interest (e.g. farmers) 
Participants are randomly assigned to the control or treatment group. 
For the control group, the environment is the one in which 
participants are naturally undertaking certain tasks. For the 
treatment group, one element of the natural environment (for 
example a policy rule) is changed. 
Participants are usually not paid for 
their participation, but get the 
benefit from the treatment. 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration, inspired by Carpenter et al. (2004) and Harrison and List (2004) 
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2.2 Main uses of experiments 
We review here the three main uses of 
experimental approaches: (1) measuring the 
causal net impact of policies; (2) 
highlighting the importance of behavioural 
factors, and (3) testing policies before 
implementation.  
2.2.1 Generate fine-tuned data enabling 
measuring the causal net impact of the 
policy 
“Controlled” experiments resolve the major 
identification issue of empirical analysis 
based on field data: demonstrate causality 
and eliminate selection bias.  
Ability to demonstrate causality  
The standard challenge of policy evaluation 
is identifying the causal impact of the 
policy, i.e. the difference between an 
outcome with the policy (data observed) and 
the outcome that would have been 
observed in the absence of the policy 
(counterfactual). 
For example, after implementation of a 
policy to support farm investments, one 
may observe that farmers have obtained 
higher yields. Yet, if over the same period 
the price of fertilizer has dropped, part of 
the yield increase may be due to increased 
fertilizer use. To understand which part of 
the yield increase can be attributed to the 
policy, one needs to consider what would 
have happened in a situation without the 
policy. To do so, information would ideally 
be available on beneficiaries of the policy 
and on those same individuals in a situation 
without the policy.  
Experiments allow creating such a set-up 
where one group (the treatment group) is 
exposed to the policy, while the other is not 
(the control group). As such, any differences 
in the results indicator between the two 
groups can be attributed to the causal 
effect of the policy. Thus, by strictly 
controlling who is and who is not affected 
by the policy, experiments can isolate the 
causal policy impacts from any other 
factors that may change at the same time.  
Ability to eliminate possible selection 
bias 
A second issue is related to the self-
selection of beneficiaries. Self-selection 
implies that only certain types of farmers or 
regions may choose to participate in a given 
programme or are programme-eligible. The 
challenge of evaluation is to distinguish the 
impact of the policy from the other pre-
existing differences between programme 
participants and non-participants. For 
example, suppose the farmers soliciting 
investment support in a region are those 
farmers with larger gross margin per 
hectare. A comparison between supported 
farmers and the others is likely to show a 
higher gross margin for the supported 
farmers. But this would not only be thanks 
to support, but also due to the fact that only 
the most profitable farms are the ones 
having received investment support. 
Experiments allow eliminating such 
selection bias by randomising participants 
across treatments: each person in the group 
of potential beneficiaries is randomly 
assigned to either the group that will be 
exposed to the policy or to the group that 
does not receive the policy. Because of this 
random assignment, the participants in both 
the beneficiary and the ‘control’ group 
should have similar (observed and 
unobserved) characteristics.  
By addressing causality and selection bias, 
experimental data can produce an unbiased 
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measure of the causal net effect of the 
policy7.  
2.2.2 Elicit economic agents' preferences 
and understand their reactions to policy 
in the presence of behavioural factors 
Behaviours are guided by perceptions, 
impulses and emotions; display biases and 
heuristics; evidence limited cognitive 
resources; are sensitive to the social 
surrounding; and are influenced by their 
cultural mind-set (Rodríguez-Priego and van 
Bavel 2014). Behavioural economists have 
shed light on the need to account for these 
behavioural elements of the decision 
context, beyond simple profit maximisation, 
in order to predict economic agents' 
responses to different policy instruments. 
Also in the farming sector, empirical 
research has shown that farmers' decisions 
are motivated by many factors that cannot 
be directly observed. Accounting for these 
behavioural factors in policy evaluation is 
particularly important in two cases (van 
Bavel et al. 2013): 
First, when behavioural change is the main 
objective of the policy. For example, getting 
farmers to select appropriate crop 
insurance, contract agri-environmental 
measures or adopt organic farming 
practices. 
Second, when agent's behavioural response 
affects the effectiveness of a given policy 
(even if the aim of the policy itself may not 
be to change behaviour). For example, 
policies intended to support farm income do 
not seek to change farmers' behaviours, but 
                                              
7
 As will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4, the 
possibility of identifying the true causal effect for the 
sample of participants in the experiment is called the 
‘internal validity’ of the experiment.  
the support may impact farmers' decisions, 
even with decoupling of direct payments, 
and this is likely to impact farm income in 
an unforeseen way. 
Some of these behavioural factors (such as 
risk aversion, time inconsistent behaviour, 
intrinsic motivations and social norms) and 
examples in the farming context are 
described in Table 2. 
While intention surveys (“what would you do 
if”) could give an indication of farmers’ 
reactions in the context of behavioural 
factors, experiments collecting stated 
preferences in a structured way (as is the 
case for DCEs) or lab and field experiments 
can reveal which of these factors are 
relevant to explain specific farmers' 
decisions and what types of policies can 
work in the presence of these behavioural 
factors (Prendergrast et al. 2008).  
It is possible to improve the effectiveness of 
the agricultural policy by taking into account 
such behavioural biases in their design and 
implementation. For example, if social 
norms are a key driver of the adoption of 
new agricultural practices, supporting 
community engagement is likely to be more 
efficient than setting up individual payment 
schemes to encourage adoption.  
 Predicted welfare effects from policy 
changes are always uncertain, in part 
because of imprecisely known parameter 
values in the policy simulation models 
used.  (Harrison, Lau, and Rutström 2011) 
Finally, experiments can reveal the value of 
behavioural parameters, which can then be 
used in simulation models (instead of 
calculating the value of such parameters 
through calibration). 
 
 20 
 
2.2.3 Test policies prior to 
implementation 
Experimental approaches encourage moving 
beyond a status quo in evidence-based 
policy making.  
 Evidence can sometimes only reflect 
what worked in the past, or in other 
countries. Focusing on what seemed to 
work in the past reinforces the status 
quo (…), while we need to strive for new 
alternatives and new knowledge to 
meet current challenges    (Breckon 
2015).  
Reliance on past observations can indicate 
that a certain policy did not work, but it 
provides little information on what new 
policies would do better. Especially when 
farmers' reactions are expected to be 
impacted structurally, yet in an unknown 
way, by the new policy, information on the 
past is often insufficient. Moreover, in many 
cases the naturally occurring variation in 
policy treatments is too small to allow 
economists to infer reliably the effects of 
new policies. For example, the differences in 
CAP direct payments that can be observed 
across farmers are likely too small to 
understand what would happen in case the 
current CAP payment scheme would 
undergo a substantial restructuring. 
Especially for innovative policies, that may 
be very different from currently 
implemented policies, we may know little on 
how stakeholders will react. Lessons based 
on past experiences may then be of little 
value. In such cases, experimental 
approaches offer the possibility of testing 
new policies ex-ante on a small scale.   
 Lessons about policy design are 
vastly cheaper when learned in the 
laboratory than through trial and error in 
the real world.  (Reeson & Nolles, 2009) 
Experiments allow testing a new policy in a 
virtual environment, or at small scale, 
before full-scale implementation, so as to 
limit the political and economic cost of a 
trial that could fail. 
 The advantage of an experimental 
approach is that you can be innovative 
and cautious at the same time…try 
things out in an overly tentative manner. 
 (Berk et al. 1985). 
Experimental approaches also offer the 
possibility of rapidly testing slight variations 
of a policy. For example, using an 
experiment one could test whether 
formulating a payment as a “compensation 
for the additional costs associated with an 
agri-environmental measure” or a “reward 
for contributing to the environmental 
conservation” makes a difference.  
Designing experiments for ex-ante 
evaluation can also contribute to provide 
new ideas to policy-makers, for example by 
shedding light on the details needed for 
effective policy implementation. 
Experiments are helpful in identifying 
potential design flaws, especially when 
there is no empirical evidence or theoretical 
predictions are difficult if not impossible to 
derive (Normann and Ricciuti 2009).  
The experience described by Cummings et 
al. (2004) offers a glimpse of how the 
design of experiments for ex-ante 
evaluation can impact policy-making. They 
explain how the joint work on the design of 
a conservation auction allowed legislators 
to realise the complexities of implementing 
an auction-like process, and the vast array 
of auction mechanisms that could be used, 
which they had not imagined with the 
institutional constraints and political 
considerations they had in mind. Moreover, 
the behaviour of the participants during the 
experiments and feedback received after 
the experiments were used to fine-tune the 
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auction procedures. Also the development of 
easily understood instructions for 
participants of the experiment provided a 
useful framework for the instructions that 
were sent to farmers when the auction was 
effectively implemented. 
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Table 2: Some examples of behavioural elements important to take into account in agricultural policy design and evaluation  
Behavioural elements Relevance in the agricultural context 
INTERNAL FACTORS: HABIT AND COGNITIVE PROCESSES 
Risk aversion  
Reluctance of a person to accept a bargain with an uncertain 
payoff rather than another bargain with more certain but 
possibly lower expected payoff. 
With a sample of 107 French farmers, Bocquého et al. (2013) have shown that more 
dedicated, wealthier farmers are less risk averse and that a large proportion is averse to 
losses and overestimate low probability extreme-outcome events.  
 
Loss aversion 
Individuals are averse to loss, i.e. they weight the value of 
losses more than the value of gains (Kahneman 2003). 
 
Loss aversion (Kahneman 2003) can explain why some farmers are reluctant to contract 
an agri-environmental measure on input use reduction, even if the reduced costs of input 
use could compensate yield loss: farmers are more sensitive to the yield losses induced 
by the adoption of an agro environmental contract, than to the increase in their expected 
revenue. As a result, an agri-environmental contract highlighting that the payment is a 
compensation to cover the implementation costs and revenue foregone from a change in 
practices is potentially less efficient than a contract stating that the payment is rewarding 
the provision of environmental services (Grolleau et al. 2015). Given loss aversion, it has 
also been shown that penalties are more efficient than bonuses to encourage the 
adoption of new milking practices among dairy farmers to improve cattle health (Valeeva 
et al. 2007; Huijps et al. 2010). 
Ambiguity aversion  
Preference for known risks over unknown risks. Ambiguity 
averse agents avoid options where incomplete information 
makes the choice feel more risky.   
Farmers are usually expected to choose the technology that provides the highest expected 
utility conditional on their aversion to risk. But, new technologies often involve ambiguity 
such that the probabilities of different outcomes are not known. Lack of information (or 
lack of confidence in this information) could then explain why some technologies are 
received less favourably than others (Ross et al. 2012). The quality and credibility of 
information policies are therefore crucial in uncertain contexts. For example, Bradford et 
al. (2014) found that the adoption of genetically modified soy seeds is not so much 
related to risk aversion, but rather to ambiguity-aversion. GM corn containing an insect-
resistance trait which reduces the ambiguity of pest damages, therefore leads to a 
important speed-up in adoption. 
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Time inconsistency 
People’s preferences tend to change over time, such that 
decisions which are made today can be inconsistent with 
long term preferences. 
Bocquého et al. (2013) observed time preferences of French farmers and found that the 
elicited individual discount rate varies with the time delay, which provides some evidence 
of possible reversal effects in long term time preferences. They also found that time 
preferences depend on the time-lag between payments. These results call for the use of 
more complex models of inter-temporal choices to design voluntary measures. In 
particular, it should be taken into account that the costs in the short run may be 
overvalued compared to the long run benefits by farmers (Mzoughi et al. 2014). This 
leads to the difficulty of engaging today in investments or actions that involve pay-offs in 
the future, even if these choices would be optimal from a long term perspective. 
Status Quo bias/Default bias 
Tendency to prefer things to stay the same, selecting the 
default option where available. 
 
The framing, design and presentation of choices, and the default options behind these 
choices, can be altered to try and help individuals to make the optimal choice  (Thaler and 
Sunstein 2008; Choi et al. 2003). For example, farmer cooperatives may be influential in 
affecting “default options” such as providing pest-resistant seeds as a default input to its 
members. Such approaches still allow farmers to opt-out should they prefer a traditional 
technology, but evidence shows that such defaults have a significant impact on behaviour. 
Choice overload 
The phenomenon occurs when many equivalent choices are 
available. Making a decision becomes overwhelming due to 
the many potential outcomes and risks that may result from 
making the wrong choice. 
 
Information overload tends to modify decision making processes. For example, people 
tend to focus on only one or two choices even when there are several possible outcomes 
(attentional bias). They may also focus on the impact of individual choices rather than the 
consequences of many choices taken together (choice bracketing). With agricultural 
production systems continuing to become more complex and information intensive, 
demands on farm decision-makers in acquiring, evaluating, and processing of information 
are ever increasing. It makes increasingly important that farmers be given quality 
information, delivered in the proper format, and at the right time. 
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The importance of intrinsic motivation 
Individuals' choices are influenced by extrinsic incentives 
(such as financial incentives), but also intrinsic ones. 
Policy focusing on economic incentives could have opposite effects if individuals feel their 
intrinsic motivations are ignored. Economic incentives can crowd out intrinsic motivations 
and overall reduce agents' effort. For example, Greiner and Gregg (2011) found that 
graziers had a very high level of conservation and lifestyle motivation and were 
motivated to lesser extents by financial/economic considerations. Conservation 
programmes need to take advantage of farmers’ stewardship ethic for maximum 
effectiveness and efficiency, and minimise the risk of crowding out intrinsic motivation 
and altruistic behaviours. 
SOCIAL FACTORS: OTHER-REGARDING BEHAVIOUR AND SOCIAL NORMS 
Reciprocity and fairness 
People may gain satisfaction from the levels of satisfaction 
and behaviours of others. (Fehr and Schmidt 1999). One 
explanation can be the positive emotional feeling (warm 
glow) people get from helping others (Andreoni 1989). 
Individuals are most likely to adopt farming practices that generate positive externalities 
on others (Kelsey 2013).  Investments in communication to the general public on the on-
going greening of farming practices is likely to further encourage farmers. 
 
Social norms and positional concerns 
Tendency to base actions and beliefs on what others are 
doing or believing. The resulting “bandwagon effect” refers to 
the probability of individual adoption increasing with respect 
to the proportion who have already done so. 
Moser and Barrett (2006) observed that the desire to conform to the behaviours of other 
farmers appears to have a positive effect on agricultural technology adoption, beyond the 
effect of social learning. Chen et al. (2009) have shown that Chinese farmers are more 
likely to renew an agri-environmental contract if they know their neighbours do so as well. 
Kuhfuss et al. (2014) found that vine-growers are more willing to provide environmental 
efforts when they have given some indications that their neighbours will also do so. 
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3 Economic experiments for 
agricultural policy evaluation: a 
review of the literature 
This chapter reviews the most noteworthy 
applications of economic experiments in the 
field of agricultural policy design and 
evaluation – without laying claim to be 
complete. In order to structure this overview 
of the literature, the following classification 
criteria were used: 
 Type of economic experiment: 
discrete choice experiments; laboratory 
experiments; field experiments; 
randomised controlled trials.  
 Type of policy to be evaluated: 
policies aiming at supporting farm 
incomes; policies to enhance the 
provision of environmental services by 
farmers; policies supporting farm 
modernisation and agricultural 
innovation. 
 Purpose of the experiment: to 
measure the net impact of existing 
policies; to test new policies prior to 
implementation; to assess the role of 
behavioural factors in farmers’ 
responses to policies.  
 Participants in the experiment: 
students, farmers, consumers or citizens. 
 Country in which the experiment 
was conducted: European Union; non-
EU industrialised country; developing 
country. 
In what follows, we classify the literature 
first by the type of experiment. We then 
group experiments broadly around the types 
of policies they evaluate.  
3.1 Discrete Choice Experiments 
The most widely used experimental 
approach to evaluate agricultural policies is 
the discrete choice format. The majority of 
these studies have focussed on estimating 
the benefits of local or regional agri-
environmental practices in the EU and non-
EU industrialised countries. The classic 
example of this type of study is a DCE with 
members of the public (e.g. landscape users 
or citizens in general) to assess the 
economic benefits of policy-induced 
changes in land use or environmental 
practices. 
Only in recent years has the DCE method 
been applied on the producer side. Examples 
include assessments of farmers’ prospective 
responses to new policies, estimation of the 
farm-level costs of participation in agri-
environmental schemes, or analysis of the 
role of non-monetary factors as drivers of 
farmers’ responses to policies.  
By bringing supply-side and demand-side 
valuations together, DCEs allow comparing 
the benefits and costs so as to maximise 
net benefits. Surprisingly, there are hitherto 
no DCE studies which have aimed to assess 
demand and supply for the same 
environmental good simultaneously. In this 
section, we focus mainly on DCE 
applications on the producer side. We only 
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briefly discuss the literature on DCEs on the 
consumer side, focusing on two examples of 
experiments to assess public preferences 
for environmental improvements.  
3.1.1 Assessing farmers’ preferences for 
agri-environmental schemes 
Most DCEs with farmers have focused on 
eliciting farmers’ preferences for 
participation in agri-environmental schemes. 
They reveal farmers’ willingness to accept 
(WTA) compensation for participation in 
such schemes. They thus provide an 
estimate of the cost of compliance with 
such agri-environmental contracts. Most 
interestingly, these experiments allow 
assessing the costs of specific attributes of 
the schemes and the heterogeneity in 
farmers’ preferences and responses. As 
such, they provide policy makers with 
information on which characteristics of the 
contract are considered most problematic or 
most desirable from farmers’ point of view, 
and they provide information on which 
types of farmers are most likely to 
participate, allowing to better fine tune and 
target policies. 
Espinosa-Goded et al. (2010) investigate 
the factors affecting farmer’s willingness to 
participate in an agri-environmental scheme 
paying Spanish farmers to cultivate alfalfa 
(a nitrogen-fixing crop). Data were obtained 
from a survey of 300 farmers undertaken in 
two regions of Spain - Aragon and 
Andalusia, representing different farming 
systems. The experimental design was 
based on a scheme which had been 
proposed for implementation in both 
Aragon’s and Andalusia’s Rural 
Development Program (RDP) for 2007–
2013. Farmers were confronted with choice 
sets in which they had to choose among 
alternative contracts, each involving distinct 
implementation requirements and a given 
compensation payment. The results indicate 
that free choice of the land offered for the 
programme and unrestricted use of the 
alfalfa crop significantly increase 
respondents’ willingness to sign a contract.  
Christensen et al. (2011) conduct a DCE 
with 444 Danish farmers to assess their 
willingness to sign contracts for pesticide-
free buffer zones. Their research was 
motivated by the observation that Danish 
farmers had been less interested in agri-
environmental schemes than anticipated. As 
in the study of Espinosa-Goded et al. 
(2010), respondents were asked to choose 
among alternative contracts, each with 
different requirements and payment levels. 
The results show that farmers prefer 
contracts with a flexible buffer zone width, 
shorter contract periods, greater flexibility in 
fertilizer use, and the option to quit the 
contract from year to year. Especially this 
last option is very highly valued, indicating 
that farmers feel very strongly about this 
possibility to re-evaluate their participation 
into the contract at a regular basis. The 
authors conclude that the overall flexibility 
of the contract might be more important to 
farmers than the land use restrictions 
imposed. The experiment yielded another 
important piece of information for policy 
makers: 14% of respondents consistently 
chose ‘no contract’ (i.e. business as usual) 
which clearly indicates that these farmers 
might be difficult to motivate to enrol in 
agri-environmental schemes. 
Ruto and Garrod (2009) gathered data from 
DCEs with farmers in 10 case study areas 
across the EU. The authors confront their 
respondents with alternative designs of a 
hypothetical agri-environmental scheme, 
each characterised by five attributes: 
compensation payment, contract length, 
whole farm or partial area participation, 
degree of flexibility in implementing 
conservation practices, and administrative 
burden for the farmer. In general, farmers 
were found to require greater financial 
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incentives to join schemes with longer 
contracts or that offer less flexibility or 
demand more paperwork. In addition, a 
large segment of farmers (‘low resistance 
adopters’) is found to be willing to accept 
relatively small incentive payments for their 
participation in schemes, even when these 
schemes are offering relatively little 
flexibility and high levels of additional 
paperwork, in contrast to a segment of ‘high 
resistance adopters’ who would be difficult 
to motivate even with very flexible schemes 
and high financial compensation. This 
suggests that the targeting of schemes to 
the most interested farmers may provide 
large efficiency gains. 
Breustedt et al. (2013 a; 2013 b) use data 
from a DCE on agri-environmental schemes 
aiming to protect ground-nesting birds in 
permanent grassland in two grassland 
regions of Schleswig-Holstein, Germany. As 
in the studies reviewed above, farmers were 
asked to make a discrete choice among 
three alternative contracts (each with 
different land use restrictions and payment 
rates) or a ‘no participation’ option. The 
contractual attributes related to stocking 
rates, fertilizer usage, set mowing dates, 
contract length and payment rates. 
Breustedt et al. (2013 a) find that, as 
expected, higher payment rates increase 
farmers’ willingness to sign an agri-
environmental contract whereas stricter 
management prescriptions reduce 
participation. The estimates of marginal 
willingness-to-accept show that farmers 
consider contractual obligations relating to 
fertilizer use and mowing dates to be 
particularly demanding. Besides contract 
design variables, a number of farm-specific 
variables affect respondents’ willingness to 
participate. Farmers, for instance, with 
previous experience in agri-environmental 
schemes are more likely to engage in a 
contract than those without such 
experience. Farms with high land use 
intensities request higher compensation 
payments than less intensive farms.  
Breustedt et al. (2013 b) investigate not 
only which among alternative agri-
environmental contracts is chosen, but also 
how much land farmers would put under 
contract. For contract 1, farmers had to 
enrol at least 5% of their permanent 
pasture; contract 2 required the enrolment 
of at least 10% and contract 3 of at least 
20% of a farm’s permanent pasture. This 
extension to the experimental design 
enabled the authors to provide information 
of direct relevance to policy makers, such as 
the estimation of a supply curve for land 
offered under conservation management as 
a function of the payment rate. More 
importantly, it allowed the authors to 
formulate optimal contracts (in terms of 
management prescriptions and payment 
levels), such that environmental benefit is 
maximised for a set of alternative program 
budgets.  
Birol et al.’s (2006) DCE investigates 
Hungarian farmers’ preferences for 
undertaking traditional farming methods on 
their small farms or home gardens, 
including crop variety diversity; cultivation 
of landraces; traditional integration of crop 
and livestock production; and use of organic 
production practices. The results reveal that 
farmers located in the most isolated 
communities derive the highest value from 
crop diversity, and among those, elderly 
derive the highest value from traditional 
landraces. Given the environmental, cultural 
and historical benefits that home gardens 
generate, the authors suggest that they 
should be supported by means of an 
appropriate agri-environmental scheme. In 
addition, the authors were able to identify 
those smallholder households that value the 
benefits the most and suggest that the 
support schemes be targeted on those 
households. 
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Kuhfuss et al. (2014) conduct a DCE with 
317 wine growers in the South East of 
France to test whether the introduction of a 
collective dimension in agri-environmental 
contracts can entice more farmers into agri-
environmental schemes, thereby initiating 
group dynamics towards reduced use of 
pesticides on the land. Their collective 
dimension takes the form of a monetary 
bonus paid per hectare to farmers 
participating in the contracts, in addition to 
standard individual compensation, on the 
condition that a predefined collective 
enrolment target (50% of the area of 
interest) is reached. Respondents were 
asked to choose between pairs of weeding 
regimes, each characterised by a set of five 
attributes, one of which was whether a 
collective bonus was offered or not. The 
others related to herbicides use restrictions 
and whether administrative and technical 
assistance was offered. The results provide 
clear evidence that introducing a collective 
bonus can improve participation rates, 
increasing the proportion of land enrolled by 
each farmer and lowering the individual 
WTA.  
Greiner (2015) reports the results of a DCE 
conducted with 104 pastoralists and 
graziers in north Australia. The experiment 
was designed to explore the factors 
affecting respondents’ willingness to sign 
voluntary on-farm biodiversity conservation 
contracts. Each choice set consisted of three 
contract alternatives and a ‘none’ option. 
Contract attributes, i.e. conservation 
requirements, stewardship payment, 
contract length and flexibility in contract 
conditions, all significantly influence 
choices, but with significant heterogeneity 
across respondents. Respondents require a 
greater monetary incentive to sign up to 
longer contract periods or alternatives 
causing higher opportunity costs.  
Introducing some level of contract flexibility 
significantly and positively influences 
contract adoption. Financial aspects of the 
contracts were the most important for 
about half of the pastoralists interviewed, 
while willingness to participate of the other 
half was significantly influenced by their 
attitudes and non-monetary motives – 
factors which can only be identified with a 
DCE. 
Broch and Vedel (2012) use a DCE to study 
the heterogeneity of farmers’ preferences 
for afforestation contracts as a means of 
targeting contracts on the specific needs of 
individual landholders. Four attributes are 
investigated: purpose of afforestation, 
option of cancelling the contract, 
compliance monitoring, and payment level. 
All attributes present a potential conflict 
between farmers’ and authorities’ interests. 
Results reveal that the option to cancel the 
contract decreases farmers’ required 
compensation level, whereas external 
monitoring increases it. Moreover, farmers 
are willing to accept a lower compensation 
when the purpose of afforestation is to 
protect biodiversity and ground water rather 
than recreation. This indicates that farmers 
have preferences not only for the 
characteristics of agri-environmental 
contracts but also for the objectives of the 
policy scheme. There is heterogeneity in 
farmers’ preferences: for example, farmers 
who already have forest land do not find 
the option of cancelling the contract 
important, whereas farmers who rely on the 
farmland for income require higher 
compensation if this option is not given. The 
findings indicate potential for efficiency 
gains from targeting the contracts at 
specific groups of farmers.  
The study by Beharry-Borg et al. (2013) 
applies DCE methodology to assess the use 
of incentive payments for farmers to adjust 
their land management practices in order to 
protect water quality. In contrast to the 
previous studies, the payments would be 
paid by a water company instead of being 
part of European or national policies. The 
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authors quantify the financial compensation 
(WTA) required by farmers to adopt water 
quality enhancing agricultural land 
management practices in two watersheds in 
Yorkshire, UK. Heterogeneity in farmers’ 
preferences and compensation 
requirements is found to be related to the 
emphasis on sheep or cattle/dairy 
production within mixed farming businesses 
in the study area.  
These studies reveal estimates of farmers’ 
willingness to accept to participate in such 
schemes, i.e. the minimum compensation 
required in exchange of participation. They 
thus provide an estimate of the cost of 
compliance with such agri-environmental 
contracts. More importantly, the DCEs allow 
to decompose the total cost of compliance 
into specific part-costs for each attribute of 
the schemes, and to reveal the 
heterogeneity in farmers’ preferences and 
WTA. As such, they provide policy makers 
with information as to which characteristics 
of the contract are considered most 
problematic or most desirable from the 
farmers’ point of view, and they provide 
information on which types of farmers are 
most likely to participate, allowing to better 
fine tune and target policies. Although the 
precise results are obviously specific to the 
scheme and location studied, the general 
conclusion from these studies is that 
introducing some flexibility in the contract 
considerably increases farmers’ willingness 
to participate, as does shorter or more 
flexible contract duration.  
Overall, DCEs seem to be particularly useful 
for optimising the design of voluntary agri-
environmental schemes. If the policy 
designer knows beforehand which 
contractual obligations farmers consider to 
be particularly demanding, this information 
can be taken into account in designing the 
contracts and calibrating payment rates. In 
this way, the informational imbalance 
between the policy designer and the farmer, 
which often impedes the design of efficient 
conservation contracts, can be mitigated. An 
outstanding feature of DCEs in this respect 
is that they provide estimates of farmers’ 
participation costs differentiated by farm 
type, location or resource settings, thereby 
allowing the policy maker to devise 
contracts for different types of farmers and 
different resource settings. This is likely to 
boost the cost-effectiveness of such 
schemes compared to the standard one-
size-fits-all contract. 
3.1.2 Assessing farmers’ responses to 
first-pillar policies 
Schulz et al. (2014) is one of the few 
applications of a DCE to inform the design 
of CAP first-pillar policies. The authors 
explore farmers’ prospective responses to 
the new ‘greening’ provisions of the 
Common Agricultural Policy. They aim to 
investigate how the ‘greening’ provisions are 
likely to affect farmers’ willingness to 
comply; to assess the farm-level costs of 
complying with the ‘greening’ provisions; 
and to explore the heterogeneity of 
preferences and costs among farmers. Their 
analysis is based on a DCE with 128 
German farmers conducted in the summer 
of 2012, i.e. before the policy entered into 
force. Participants were asked to choose 
between a ‘greening’ option with a given set 
of management prescriptions and an ‘opt-
out’ alternative with a stipulated cut of the 
single direct payment.  
The authors find that farmers perceive 
‘greening’ as a costly constraint, but not all 
farmers are equally affected and not all 
‘greening’ provisions are regarded as 
equally demanding. The share of Ecological 
Focus Area (EFA) has a strong impact on the 
choice to comply with greening provisions. 
The surface of EFA is valued at the rental 
value of arable land. If productive uses of 
the EFA (by opposition to EFA must be set-
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aside) are allowed, the likelihood of 
greening being preferred increases. By 
contrast, and maybe surprisingly, the 
possibility of counting as EFA existing 
landscape features on a farm (such as 
hedges or trees) or land enrolled in agri-
environmental schemes does not affect the 
likelihood of ‘greening’ being preferred to 
‘opt-out’. Farms with high opportunity costs 
of arable land are found to be more inclined 
to opt out and voluntarily forgo the 
‘greening’ premium than farmers with lower 
land opportunity costs. The analysis also 
revealed that a small group of farmers will 
fiercely reject ‘greening’: 14% of 
respondents never chose a ‘greening’ 
alternative.  
The research by Lips and Gazzarin (2008) 
represents another application of a DCE to 
inform first-pillar type policies. The authors 
elicit the intentions and preferences of 
Swiss dairy farmers for pursuing their work 
as farmers after abolishment of the milk 
quota in Switzerland. The analysis is based 
on a DCE with 304 dairy farmers carried out 
in the Eastern part of Switzerland before 
the quota was abolished. Respondents were 
asked to choose between the status quo 
(milk production) and alternatives consisting 
of several combinations of four attributes. 
The attributes comprise the type of farming 
(milk production, suckler cows, farming 
without livestock, leaving farming), 
employment status (self-employed, 
employed), days of holiday per year, and 
income per year. The results indicate that 
there is a strong preference to stay in dairy 
production. In order to entice farmers to 
give up milk production, a financial 
compensation (in the form of additional 
income) of at least CHF 25’000 per year 
would be necessary. This is more than 60 
percent of the income per family member in 
dairy production. Given this very high 
compensation requirement, which is partly 
driven by non-monetary motives, the 
authors conclude that an agricultural policy 
programme based on financial incentives 
designed to motivate dairy farmers to quit 
milk production is likely to fail.  
The study by Paulrud and Laitila (2010) is 
an example of a DCE designed to inform 
Swedish energy crops policy.  The authors 
use the DCE method to analyse how 
Swedish farmers assess the relative merits 
of the characteristics associated with 
growing energy crops. An additional goal is 
to explore farmers’ willingness to grow 
energy crops as a function of different 
levels of income and subsidies. The authors 
conducted two DCEs. In the first experiment, 
farmers had to choose between two 
(unspecified) energy crops, each 
characterized by six attributes. The 
attributes related to the institutional and 
agronomic setup of the production process, 
e.g. how the crops would be integrated into 
arable rotations, whether they would be 
grown independently or on contract, 
whether conventional farming machinery 
could be used in their cultivation, whether a 
subsidy is offered and whether the crop 
would affect the visual quality of the 
countryside. The second experiment 
specified four energy crops (willow, hemp, 
energy grains and canary grass) and 
characterised them in terms of their net 
contribution to farm income with and 
without subsidy. Respondents were then 
asked to state how many hectares of each 
crop they would be willing to grow on their 
arable land with and without energy crop 
subsidy. The results of the first experiment 
suggest that the visual impact on the 
countryside and the rotation period of the 
energy crops have a significant impact on 
the willingness to cultivate such crops. The 
second experiment showed that an 
increased contribution of a specific crop to 
net income raises the amount of arable land 
devoted to growing that crop. It was also 
found that farmers’ age, farm size and the 
geographical location of the farm had a 
significant effect on the willingness to grow 
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energy crops, whereas other farm features 
(such as share of leased land or set-aside 
land or farm type) did not.  
3.1.3 Assessing public preferences for 
environmental improvements 
DCEs focussing on the estimation of the 
benefits for the public of the provision of 
environmental services by agriculture have 
covered a wide range of issues. We provide 
here only two examples of how DCEs have 
been used to inform the design of agri-
environmental policies by providing policy 
makers with estimates of the public’s 
preferences for environmental 
improvements. Many more examples can be 
found in the literature on the evaluation of 
public preferences for environmental, 
cultural and social features of landscapes, 
natural habitats or species. The book 
“Choice Experiments Informing 
Environmental Policy” edited by Birol and 
Koundouri (2008) provides a good account 
of the literature up until 2008. 
Hanley et al.’s (1998) work focuses on 
benefit estimation for Environmentally 
Sensitive Areas (ESA) in Scotland, the first 
generation of co-funded agri-environmental 
schemes in the UK. For a specific ESA in 
Scotland, the authors identify farm 
woodlands, archaeological features, heather 
moors, wet grasslands and drystone walls 
as important landscape features, which 
could be affected by the ESA. Their analysis 
shows that the public places the highest 
value on schemes that improve farm 
woodlands, followed by heather moors and 
wet grasslands. The lowest public values 
were found for schemes that target the 
improvement of archaeological features. 
The authors conclude that the ESA should 
therefore prioritise the provision of 
woodlands on farms.  
Another DCE study that focuses on nature 
conservation from public perspective is that 
by Li et al. (2004). The study investigates 
the preferences of the Finnish public for 
increasing the area under preservation in 
Natura 2000 areas. The analysis of the data 
reveals considerable preference 
heterogeneity among the public. Overall, the 
Finnish public is more sensitive to a 
decrease in the Natura 2000 area than to 
an increase of that area: the mean 
willingness-to-pay (WTP) to prevent a 
decrease was found to be four times higher 
than the mean WTP for an increase. 
Moreover, the marginal value of nature 
preservation falls to zero after an increase 
of only 3% in the size of the currently 
preserved area. These results are expected 
to aid policy makers in their cost-benefit 
analysis of alternative nature preservation 
programmes in Finland.  
3.2 Lab and field experiments  
Several studies have used lab and field 
experiments to analyse the best design for 
the agricultural policy. A small number of 
studies have focused on first-pillar type of 
agricultural policies, both in the US and in 
the EU, while the literature on experiments 
for agri-environmental policy evaluation is 
more extensive. 
3.2.1 Applications to assess the net 
impact of first-pillar type policies  
Most studies related to first-pillar type of 
agricultural policies focus on the design of 
support payments and their impact on 
production decisions. 
Bahrs et al. (2008) investigate different 
trading mechanisms for EU decoupled 
payment entitlements introduced with the 
Fischler Reform of the CAP in 2005. Since, 
at the time, policies had changed only 
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recently and the trading had just started, 
real-world market evidence was spurious 
and anecdotal. Thus, controlled laboratory 
experiments were conducted to provide first 
insights into potential market outcomes and 
how they are influenced by trading rules. 
The authors assume that, at least in early 
stages, the exchange of subsidy 
entitlements would occur in a private and 
decentralized setting - for example, 
between neighbours in the same village. 
Their experimental setup reflected this 
situation by allowing student subjects to 
trade with only one other subject at a time. 
They compare this setting of decentralised 
bilateral negotiations with a setting with 
centralised trading, such as posted-bid or 
posted-ask trading.  
At the start of the experiment, each subject 
was endowed with land (defined to be 
untradeable) and tradable ‘high-value’ and 
‘low-value’ subsidy entitlements. Ten rounds 
were played with 10 players. At the end of 
each round, subsidies were paid only for 
‘activated’ entitlements, i.e. only if the 
participants had the corresponding land. The 
main finding is that market institutions have 
a large impact on outcomes: decentralised 
bilateral negotiations do not generate 
outcomes that are as efficient as those in 
the more centralised market institutions.  
Motivated by policy changes introduced in 
the US 2002 Farm Act, McIntosh et al. 
(2007) investigate supply responses to 
countercyclical payments given to farmers 
(in addition to direct payments) in a world 
of price uncertainty. Students first had to 
allocate a fixed number of acres to a base 
crop, i.e. a crop eligible to enrol in the Direct 
and Countercyclical Program, and a non-
base crop. Each participants’ task was then 
to allocate acres under three different policy 
scenarios: (a) the baseline case: price 
uncertainty with DPs and without 
countercyclical payments (CCPs); (b) the CCP 
case: price uncertainty with DPs and the 
CCPs; (c) the policy risk case: participants 
had to make their allocation decisions while 
the type of policy was uncertain (it could be 
the baseline, the CCP case or another 
scheme called ‘mandatory base updating’).8 
Ten rounds were played for each of the 3 
scenarios, with 88 student participants. The 
experiment allowed comparing behaviour in 
the CCP case and the policy risk case 
against the baseline case to better 
understand how CCPs and policy risk affect 
crop allocation decisions. The experimental 
evidence suggests that CCPs lead to greater 
income certainty but less efficient 
production decisions and (possibly) higher 
government payments because participants 
allocated more acres to the base crops 
relative to the baseline, which are eligible 
for countercyclical payments - supporting 
some of the criticisms of CCPs.   
Nagler et al. (2009) and Bastian et al. 
(2008) report the results of an economic 
experiment to investigate the impacts on 
production decisions of the bond scheme, an 
alternative to the single farm payment (SFP) 
scheme. Producers would receive a buy-out 
of future SFP entitlement, and be issued 
with bonds. Such a bond could consist of 
annual payments for several years, or to a 
one-time lump-sum payment equivalent to 
these annual payments. The bonds would be 
transferable and could be sold. Hence, this 
would correspond to a guaranteed stream 
of income during a transition period of 15 
to 25 years in exchange for giving up all 
future subsidy entitlements. In a lab 
experiment with economic students, the 
                                              
8
 The 2002 Farm Bill allowed farmers who received 
direct payments between 1996 and 2002 to choose 
between keeping their old base acreage or updating 
base acres to reflect average planted acres for eligible 
commodities during the 1998-2001 crop years. In the 
experiment, mandatory base acreage updating meant 
automatically adjusting the base acreage to the 
cropping allocations of the current round.  
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authors investigate four experimental 
treatments each involving 40 trading 
periods (representing production seasons): 
(1) the base treatment of no policy (NP) 
intervention for 40 trading periods; (2) a 
coupled price-support policy for 40 trading 
periods; (3) a coupled price-support policy 
for the first 20 periods, followed by a 
decoupled annual subsidy for the last 20 
trading periods; and (4) a coupled price-
support policy for the first 20 periods 
followed by a buyout bond consisting of a 
decoupled lump sum subsidy received by 
participants in period 21, with no policy 
intervention for the remaining 19 periods.  
As expected, production with a coupled 
price-support policy was substantially 
higher than with no policy. A shift from price 
support to equivalent decoupled annual or 
lump-sum payments resulted in production 
levels at or near no-policy levels, providing 
evidence to support the theoretical 
prediction that bond schemes would not 
result in production distortions.  
Nagler et al. (2013) conducted a lab 
experiment with both students and 
agricultural professionals to estimate the 
capitalisation of subsidies into land rental 
prices. For both types of participants to the 
experiment, land rental prices converged to 
a value approximately four and a half 
tokens higher when a 20-token per-unit 
subsidy was paid, compare to a treatment 
with no subsidy. These experimental results 
are similar to empirical estimates: one 
fourth to one fifth of the subsidy is passed 
on to the rental price of land.  
A last example concerns the effect of price 
support. Maart-Noelck et al. (2013) study 
the impact of a price floor on investment 
behaviour. Price floors such as intervention 
prices for agricultural commodities or 
guaranteed feed-in tariffs for renewable 
energies are often claimed to have a 
stimulating effect on investment behaviour 
because they reduce the risk of 
unfavourable outcomes. This study uses an 
experimental approach to test whether this 
is indeed the case. The study design is 
based on two scenarios: one ‘with price 
floor’ (WPF) and one with ‘no price floor’ 
(NPF). Participants were 101 German 
students of agriculture. A first group of 
students faced at first the NPF scenario 
without any market intervention. After ten 
repetitions the participants played the WPF 
scenario. The other group faced both 
treatments in reverse order.  
The main results derived from the 
experiment can be summarised as follows: 
First, actual investment behaviour did not 
differ significantly with respect to the 
presence of a price floor. Second, abolishing 
the price floor, leads to investment inertia: 
participants who first played the WPF 
treatment tended to invest more reluctantly 
over both treatments than participants who 
faced the treatments in reverse order. Third, 
participants invested, on average, much 
later than theoretically predicted by the net 
present value (NPV) approach and much 
earlier than predicted by the real options 
approach (ROA) in either treatment. Fourth, 
participants learned from personal 
experience during the experiment and 
approached the theoretical ROA benchmarks 
over time. The authors conclude that price 
floors do not necessarily stimulate 
investment behaviour - although higher 
levels of price floors than those used in this 
experiment may still be found to be 
effective - and that investment theory does 
not predict actual investment behaviour 
particularly well.  
3.2.2 Applications to agri-environmental 
policies  
Recently, a number of studies have 
analysed experimentally the potential use of 
conservation auctions (or conservation 
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tenders as they are usually called in the 
literature) in agri-environmental policy. 
Economic experiments involving auctions 
are widely used in the traditional areas of 
competition policy and auction design, but 
agricultural and agri-environmental policy 
experiments are relatively new.  
Environmental auctions are a mechanism 
whereby conservation contracts with well 
specified sets of management prescriptions 
are allocated to private landholders on the 
basis of competitive bidding. Bids take the 
form of requests for financial compensation 
in return for implementing the contractual 
obligations on one’s land. Auctions are 
considered as a more efficient alternative to 
the currently used fixed-price contracts of 
the CAP’s agri-environmental schemes, 
given the potential to acquire a greater 
quantity of conservation effort for the same 
budget (Latacz-Lohmann and van der 
Hamsvoort 1997). 
While such auctions have been organised in 
the US or in Australia, to date, no EU 
country has made use of conservation 
tenders at a large scale, although the legal 
requirements for their use have been 
created.  
The experimental study of conservation 
tenders analyses what type of auctions, 
what information provision etc. generate the 
best outcomes. They use either controlled 
lab experiments or the sequential 
combination of lab experiments and small-
scale field trials.  
Cason et al. (2003) investigated the 
BushTender trials in the Australian state of 
Victoria, which were designed to conserve 
the last remaining patches of native 
vegetation by fencing these areas off, 
excluding livestock, refraining from using 
pesticides, etc. Farmers who have native 
vegetation on their land were invited to 
submit financial bids for agreeing to 
conserve the land in pristine state. This 
study was the first to propose a 
combination of lab and field experiments: 
prior to testing this programme in the field, 
certain design problems, in particular the 
amount and choice of the information to be 
communicated to landholders before the 
bidding session, was investigated 
experimentally in the lab with students. In a 
second stage, the experiment was moved to 
the field, with farmers as participants.  
They tested whether or not it is a good idea 
to reveal the environmental benefit that the 
contract is expected to deliver before the 
landholders are submitting their bids. 
Revealing the benefits may provide 
landholders with information on the most 
beneficial land use changes or what types 
of land to offer for conservation. On the 
other hand, revealing information may lead 
to strategic bidding behaviour. The authors 
find that revealing the benefits led to lower 
environmental benefit and higher 
landholder profits.  
In follow-up work, Cason and Gangadharan 
(2005) study the outcome properties of 
uniform versus discriminatory-price auctions 
for reducing non-point source pollution 
resulting from fertilizer use. In the uniform-
price format, all successful bidders are paid 
the price of the lowest rejected bid, while a 
discriminatory-price auction pays successful 
bidders their own bid. The results from their 
lab experiment with students show that 
overbidding is more pronounced in the 
discriminatory-price auction but it had 
superior overall performance in terms of 
value for money for the environmental 
agency. This can be explained by the fact 
that, in the uniform-price auction, some 
landowners are ‘overpaid’ because, by 
construction of the auction, they receive 
payments largely in excess of their 
opportunity cost.  
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Schilizzi and Latacz-Lohmann (2013) 
conducted a framed lab experiment with 
students to assess the performance of 
budget-constrained versus target-
constrained conservation tenders and 
compare this to equivalent fixed-price agri-
environmental schemes. In the budget-
constrained format, the agency accepts bids 
until a given budget is exhausted, while in a 
target-constrained auction the agency sets 
an overall environmental target and accepts 
bids until this target is achieved. The study 
was framed in the context of an agri-
environmental scheme for the adoption of 
farm technologies to reduce non-point 
source pollution. The experiment involved 
multiple bidding rounds for both auction 
formats. The results indicate that the choice 
of format did not have much effect on 
auction performance.  
The Flint River Drought Protection Act 
passed in Georgia in 2000, mandated that 
an auction-like process for foregoing 
irrigation be implemented in years of 
drought. By running experimental auctions, 
both in the laboratory and with farmers, 
prior to the actual irrigation auctions, 
Cummings et al. (2004) were able to make 
suggestions on the auction design to make 
it more competitive and at the same time 
better understood by the participants. They 
compared uniform and discriminative 
pricing formats, as well as different tie-
breaking rules 9  (inclusive or random) to 
inhibit collusion, and whether or not 
information was provided on the highest 
accepted price of offers. The aim was to 
maximise the land area taken out of 
irrigation, given a fixed budget. The random 
tie-breaking rule, and not announcing the 
price of the provisionally accepted offers, 
                                              
9
 A tie-breaking rule must be applied when two or 
more bids are equal at the cut-off price. The tie-
breaking rule determines which of the bids is 
accepted and which are rejected.  
resulted on average in better value for 
money for the procuring agency. These two 
features, along with the discriminative-price 
format, which performed similarly to the 
uniform-price format in the experiments but 
was preferred for political reasons, were 
adopted in the actual field auction 
conducted in 2001. 
Another question investigated with 
experiments is the monitoring of farmers’ 
compliance with the prescriptions of 
conservation contracts. Kawasaki et al. 
(2012) have analysed the impact of 
imperfect monitoring, which provides 
farmers with a moral hazard incentive for 
non-compliance because they can receive 
conservation payments without 
implementing the conservation scheme. The 
authors compare bidding behaviour and 
auction performance for discriminatory-
price and uniform-price auctions in an 
imperfect monitoring environment. While 
their theoretical analysis suggests that 
there should be no performance differences 
between the two auction formats, their 
laboratory experiments revealed 
contradictory results: while the 
discriminatory-price auction had an 
advantage in terms of cost-effectiveness, 
the uniform-price auction tended to have 
higher overall efficiency when non-
compliance behaviour was taken into 
account. The analysis thus highlights the 
need for policy makers to consider the 
efficiency of policies holistically, not just at 
the moment of allocating contracts. 
Another key aspect of conservation contract 
design is that environmentally friendly land 
use practices often deliver greater 
biodiversity and habitat enhancements 
when they are located on spatially adjacent 
land parcels with connections between 
them. One approach to spatially 
coordinating conservation efforts across 
multiple private properties is the 
agglomeration bonus, first proposed by 
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Parkhurst et al. (2002) and Parkhurst and 
Shogren (2007). By rewarding similar land 
uses on adjacent parcels, the agglomeration 
bonus provides economic incentives for the 
creation of non-fragmented land use 
patterns on the landscape. Because of the 
complexity of this incentive mechanism, 
theoretical modelling can only yield limited 
insights into its environmental 
effectiveness. Parkhurst et al. (2002) thus 
tested the agglomeration bonus 
experimentally. Their experiments (with 
students) indicate that including an 
agglomeration bonus significantly 
decreased the fragmentation of the 
conserved land compared. Allowing for 
communication between participants before 
the start of the game further improved 
results. In later work, Parkhurst and Shogren 
(2007, 2008) check the robustness of their 
results in a more realistic, but more 
complicated, spatial-coordination setting. 
The agglomeration bonus remained an 
effective policy tool in this more complex 
setting once participants gain experience. 
The studies by Reeson and Tisdell (2010), 
Rolfe et al. (2009) and Banerjee et al. 
(2014) link the contract design and 
conservation auction literatures by 
integrating an agglomeration bonus into a 
conservation auction and analysing the 
cost-efficiency of different auction formats.  
Latacz-Lohmann et al. (2012) evaluate the 
efficiency of a new contract design, in which 
payments are linked to environmental 
outcomes (rather than management 
prescriptions) and contracts are tendered 
(rather than paying landholders uniform 
prices). Controlled lab experiments with 
students were run, systematically varying 
the rate at which payments are linked to 
environmental outcomes. Results show that 
when the share of the payment linked to 
outcome increases, more effort in 
conservation is observed but the 
participation rate falls. Indeed, outcome-
based payments create the risk for 
landholders of a poor environmental 
outcome and low payment, which may 
result in low participation rates. Tendering 
such incentive contracts further increases 
conservation effort, but at a decreasing rate 
as the proportion of performance payments 
increases. These results highlight the trade-
off between maximising the expected level 
of environmental outcome and maximising 
budgetary cost-effectiveness.  
3.3 Randomised Control Trials  
RCTs have been used to evaluate 
agricultural policy interventions mainly in 
developing countries. To the best of the 
authors’ knowledge, up to now there exist 
no applications to the CAP. The examples 
selected serve as illustration of how the RCT 
methodology can be applied to a wide 
variety of policy interventions, including 
programmes on farmers’ training, fertilizer 
subsidies, agricultural loans, improved seed 
varieties, and the provision of marketing 
information. Most of these interventions 
target specific problems of the agricultural 
sector at a very local scale, and its 
evaluation may therefore encompass 
different stakes and constraints than the 
evaluation of the EU-wide Common 
Agricultural Policy. Although the studies 
reviewed may be only remotely relevant for 
informing the design of agricultural policy in 
the EU, the RCT methodology itself promises 
some potential for that purpose, as will be 
discussed in more detail in the chapter 5 of 
this report.  
The RCT by Duflo et al. (2011) explores the 
effectiveness of alternative policy 
interventions to incentivise Kenyan farmers 
to use fertilizer. The authors state that 
farmers in Western Kenya fail to take 
advantage of apparently profitable fertilizer 
investments for two possible reasons: (1) 
unaffordability due to lack of cash or access 
to credit; or (2) issues of timing and 
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impatience: at harvest time farmers do 
have cash available but are not motivated 
to buy fertilizer in advance. Later in the 
season when fertilizer is needed there is no 
cash left. The authors thus hypothesise that 
policies which encourage farmers to buy 
fertilizer immediately after harvest could 
increase fertilizer use. They test whether 
adaptations to an established subsidy 
programme, the ‘Savings and Fertilizer 
Initiative (SAFI)’, can enhance fertilizer use. 
More precisely, the experiment tests 
whether incentives in the form of time-
limited discounts on the cost of acquiring 
fertilizer just after harvest, lead to an 
increase in farmers’ use of fertilizer.  
In a first season, a sample of farmers 
received the SAFI programme in its basic 
form: the basic SAFI programme provided 
fertilizer immediately after harvest, when 
farmers tend to have cash on hand, and 
offered free delivery, on a date of their 
choice, of any combination of planting or 
top dressing fertilizer. Farmers had to make 
a decision and purchase immediately after 
harvest.  
In the second season, a new sample of 
farmers was selected, who were randomly 
assigned to one of the following five 
groups, each receiving a different version of 
the SAFI programme: Group 1 received a 
basic SAFI offer as described above. Group 
2 was offered SAFI with the option to freely 
choose the timing of fertilizer purchase. 
Group 3 was offered free delivery of 
fertilizer through SAFI close to the time 
fertilizer needs to be applied, with payments 
due at that time. To calibrate the effect of a 
discount, Group 4 was visited during the 
same period as Group 3 and offered 
fertilizer at a 50 percent price discount. This 
allows comparing the effect of a heavy (50 
percent) subsidy offered during the growing 
season to the effect of the small nudge (in 
the form of free delivery) offered by the 
SAFI programme (Group 1). A fifth 
comparison group who received no incentive 
to purchase fertilizer served as a reference.  
The farmers were randomly selected into 
each of the treatments. The main outcome 
of interest was the fertilizer use, with 
fertilizer purchase through the programme 
as an intermediate outcome.  
The results suggest that an early small 
discount covering the delivery costs for 
fertilizer induces the same increase in 
fertilizer adoption as a heavy subsidy 
offered later in the season. 
Bulte et al.’s (2014) analyse a policy 
intervention aiming at increasing the use of 
a modern cowpea seed variety in central 
Tanzania. Their experimental set-up aims to 
control for the fact that the yield increase 
resulting from using improved seed 
varieties may be partially related to farmers 
changing their behaviour (for example,  
providing more effort because of their high 
expectations on this new variety). In order to 
do so, the authors compare an ‘open’ and a 
‘double-blind’ RCT. This consists at the same 
time of an important methodological 
innovation, because in policy experiments 
double-blind interventions are not the 
standard. The authors expect that, since the 
participants of the open RCT group know 
they are ‘treated’, they will adjust their 
behaviour. To gauge the potential 
magnitude of this behavioural effect, the 
authors contrast such an open RCT to a 
double-blind trial. 583 farmers were 
randomly selected to participate in the 
experiment. . The participants were 
randomly divided up in four groups. Each 
group received randomly cowpea seed of 
either a modern (improved) type or the 
traditional, local type of cowpea seed. In 
addition, participants in the open RCT were 
informed of the type of seed they had been 
given, while the participants in the double-
blind RCT did not know whether they had 
received seed of an improved or a 
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traditional variety. Participants in all 
treatments were informed that the modern 
seeds yield higher and mature earlier. The 
seed types were indistinguishable in terms 
of size and colour. This experimental set-up 
aimed to identify the impact of these 
different treatments on the total harvest of 
cowpeas.  
The results can be summarised as follows: 
The harvest of farmers who were informed 
that they had received improved seeds was 
greater. But when farmers were unaware of 
the type of seed allocated to them, the 
modern seed type did not outperform the 
traditional type. Therefore the results 
strongly suggest that effort matters: 
farmers who were unsure about the quality 
of their seed (in the double-blind 
experiment) and farmers who knew they 
received the modern seed (in the open RCT) 
put more efforts (i.e. they planted their seed 
on larger plots) than farmers who knew 
they received the traditional seed (control 
group in the RCT). Thanks to this innovative 
experimental design, the positive impact on 
production of the modern seed can be 
attributed to an increase in farmers’ effort 
rather than to the improved variety itself. 
This RCT points to the importance of 
behavioural factors, which traditional policy 
evaluation techniques would have 
overlooked.  
The RCT study by Giné et al. (2012) 
examines ways to improve the pay-back of 
agricultural loans to farmers in Malawi. The 
study analyses the impacts of improved 
personal identification (through 
fingerprinting) on the behaviour of 
borrowers in a micro-loan scheme. In the 
treatment group, each farmer had a 
fingerprint collected as part of the loan 
application. An explanation was given that 
the fingerprint would be used to identify 
them on any future loan applications. The 
results show that fingerprinting: (1) did not 
deter farmers from taking out loans; (2) 
improved loan repayment, particularly for 
borrowers expected to have the poorest 
repayment performance; and (3) led 
farmers to allocate more land and farming 
inputs to the most profitable crop (paprika) 
with which loans were repaid.  
Using data from a randomised experiment 
in rural China, Cai et al. (2015) examine the 
effect of social networks on the take-up of 
a weather insurance scheme by rice 
farmers. The experiment provided financial 
education to a randomly chosen subset of 
farmers. The authors find that financial 
education about insurance and its benefits 
improves take-up by 43% compared to a 
reference group which received no such 
education. Large spill-over effects of 
financial education on adoption by others 
were also observed: for untreated farmers, 
the effect of having a friend that did receive 
the financial education treatment, lead to 
an important increase in take-up,  
equivalent to offering a 15% reduction in 
the insurance premium. Hence, this 
experiment highlights the importance of 
network effects among farmers. 
Blair et al. (2013) use an RCT to examine 
the effectiveness of a farmer training 
programme throughout Armenia. By 
comparing the treatment group of farmers 
who received training to a randomly 
selected reference group, the authors 
conclude that training did not increase 
household income or consumption, nor did it 
affect intermediate outcomes such as 
adoption of improved agricultural practices 
or changes in cultivation of crops, 
suggesting that longer-term impacts are 
unlikely to materialise.  
Nakasone (2013) applies the RCT 
methodology to study the role of price 
information on farmers’ marketing 
outcomes in the central highlands of Peru. A 
group of farmers in randomly selected 
villages was provided with mobile phones, 
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through which they received detailed price 
information for the most relevant crops in 
six regional markets. The results show that 
those provided with the phones received 
higher prices for their products. Information 
also made farmers more likely to sell their 
crops. The study also investigates the 
possibility of information spill-overs by 
examining marketing outcomes of 
households who did not receive the mobile 
phones but lived in villages where others 
did. Yet, no evidence for such spill-over 
effects was found in this study. In a similar 
experiment, Fafchamps and Minten (2012) 
assess the benefits of an SMS-based 
agricultural information service in India. The 
price information is expected to improve 
farmers’ ability to negotiate with buyers 
and to enable them to arbitrate better 
across different sales outlet. The weather 
information should help farmers reduce 
crop losses due to storms. They conducted 
an RCT, in which farmers in some (randomly 
selected) villages were offered free 
subscription to the SMS information service. 
In other villages, only some farmers were 
offered participation, in order to assess 
whether the information provided to some 
farmers is transmitted to other non-
participating farmers in the same village. 
The third group is a control group. The 
results find no statistically significant effect 
of the treatment on the price received, crop 
losses or on the likelihood of changing crop 
varieties and cultivation practices. They do 
find an effect on where farmers sell their 
crop: farmers receiving SMS information are 
less likely to sell at farm-gate and more 
likely to sell at more distant wholesale 
markets. They conclude that even though 
the information provided did not improve 
outcomes in India, the provision of price 
information may still be beneficial in other 
settings, where markets are more 
disorganised, segmented or too thin to 
attract a sufficient number of buyers. 
While most RCTs reviewed here are 
evaluations of programmes supporting 
agriculture in the developing world, these 
applications do illustrate the potential of 
RCTs to inform agricultural policies also in 
countries with modern agriculture and a 
well-developed agricultural policy.
 40 
 
4 Is there room for economic 
experiments in the EU 
agricultural policy evaluation 
toolbox? 
 
This chapter aims to assess the potential 
contribution of experimental approaches to 
the EU agricultural policy evaluation toolbox. 
We first present the traditional tools used 
by the European Commission to evaluate 
the CAP, including case study analyses, 
simulation approaches and econometric 
analyses of observational data. Second, we 
highlight the recent evolutions in the CAP 
calling for innovations in the evaluation 
toolbox. Finally, we summarise the 
complementarities between experimental 
and the non-experimental approaches. 
4.1 The existing policy evaluation 
toolbox 
Evaluation of EU agricultural policy relies on 
a large diversity of methodologies. 
Data sources traditionally used to evaluate 
agricultural policy are: 
 Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN): 
data collected annually for a sample of 
more than 80.000 farms under the 
supervision of DG AGRI. 
 Farm Structure Survey (FSS): data 
collected by Eurostat across the entire 
EU farm population. 
 Market data from Eurostat, OECD, FAO… 
 Administrative data collected by 
Member States. 
 Qualitative information, often focused 
on a specific topic, collected through 
surveys, focus group or stakeholders 
interviews.  
To evaluate the impact, efficiency (right use 
of resources) and effectiveness 
(achievement of goals) of a policy, these 
data are used in case-study analyses, to 
feed and calibrate simulation models, or can 
be analysed with statistical and econometric 
methods.  
4.1.1 Case studies  
Based on a combination of secondary data 
with qualitative information collected 
through interviews with key stakeholders, 
focus group or ad-hoc surveys, case studies 
can bring further information on a specific 
question or area. In ex-post evaluation, case 
studies allow the analyst to develop the 
answers to the evaluation questions in the 
light of the experience of a limited number 
of regions or countries. For ex-ante 
evaluation, case studies can for example 
provide valuable information on 
stakeholders’ likely reaction to alternative 
policy scenarios.  
Although case studies might entail analysis 
of quantitative data, identifying the net 
causal impact of a policy remains difficult 
using a case-study approach, as many other 
factors may have played a role in defining 
the final outcome, and data on these other 
factors is usually not available. Also, the 
interviewed stakeholders may not provide a 
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representative picture of all those affected, 
or people’s reported reactions may not 
correspond entirely to their actual 
behaviour. Moreover, many case studies are 
needed to draw general conclusions given 
the limited scope of each case study. 
Therefore, this method can be very costly 
when studying the EU wide impact of a 
policy change. Actually, case studies serve 
more often as illustration of the general 
analysis. They are only one element of a 
larger evaluation approach. 
4.1.2 Simulation models 
Simulation models of European agricultural 
production are the main tool for ex-ante 
evaluation used in DG AGRI. Examples of 
models for the evaluation of policy change 
in the EU agricultural sector include: 
 CAPRI (Common Agricultural Policy 
Regionalised Impact Modelling System): 
It was initially designed to assess the 
1992 CAP reform and adjusted since to 
simulate other CAP changes at the 
regional (nuts 2) level.  
 AGLINK-COSIMO modelling system: one 
of the most comprehensive partial 
equilibrium models for global agriculture 
used in the generation of baseline 
projections underlying the OECD-FAO 
Agricultural Outlook. 
 MAGNET (Modular Applied GeNeral 
Equilibrium Tool): global computable 
general equilibrium model, with a 
special focus on the agricultural sector. 
 IFM-CAP (Individual Farm Model of CAP 
Analysis): EU-wide mathematical 
programming model based on individual 
farms, used to simulate farmers’ 
decision making under alternative policy 
options and the resulting impacts on 
agricultural production, farm incomes 
and the environment (Louhichi et al., 
2015).  
These simulation models are used to 
explore important changes in policy options 
such as quota abolishment, decoupling of 
direct payments, trade agreements and 
bioenergy policies. The main advantage of 
simulation models is that they generally 
allow analysing the impact of a policy on 
various criteria such as economic 
performance (e.g. change in farmers’ 
income) or environmental performance (e.g. 
nitrogen use). 
The main limitation of such models is their 
reliance on many assumptions and 
exogenous parameters. For example, in 
most cases, the underlying decision model 
is the maximisation of farmers’ expected 
profit under various constraints relating to 
the availability of fixed variable factors of 
production, to the structure of technology 
and to production costs. It can become 
difficult to discern whether the results 
obtained from such simulations come from 
the data or are driven by the technical 
assumptions. Systematic sensitivity analysis 
must be undertaken as results of 
simulations may greatly depend on the 
choice of some parameters (the calibration 
issue).  
4.1.3 Statistical and econometric 
analysis of survey data 
The econometric analysis for EU agricultural 
policy evaluation is facilitated by the 
availability of high-quality agricultural 
statistics, both at Member State and EU 
level.  
The Farm Accountancy Data Network is a 
very useful monitoring instrument to 
evaluate ex-post the impact of CAP changes 
on farm income, crop choices, input use etc. 
This large data base is representative of the 
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EU farming sector in many dimensions for 
“commercial farms”, but so-called small 
farms are not in the sample, which can 
induce some selection bias in estimations 
using FADN data.  
The main limitation of the use of 
observational data (such as FADN data) for 
policy evaluation is the difficulty to obtain 
data corresponding to the counterfactual, in 
order to assess the causal impact of the 
policy (see 2.2.1). Studies therefore rely on 
the comparison of one group which is 
affected by the policy to a group which is 
not, or they compare the situation before 
and after the policy. Yet such a between-
groups comparison is only valid if the group 
affected by the policy is perfectly similar to 
the group which is not affected; in practice 
this is rarely the case. Selection criteria or 
self-selection causes the two groups to 
differ. Also, a before-after comparison, 
which compares the outcomes after the 
policy to the baseline situation, is usually 
not satisfactory since most likely also other 
factors which affect the outcome variable 
have changed over the period under study.  
More sophisticated econometric methods 
have been developed in order to identify the 
causal effect of a policy from observational 
data (EC 2013b; Loi and Rodrigues 2012). 
Since many of these methods consist of 
artificially ‘constructing’ or mimicking the 
counterfactual, these methods are also 
called quasi-experimental approaches. The 
following empirical strategies aim to 
construct a proper counterfactual from 
observational data in order to isolate causal 
impacts: instrumental variables estimations, 
regression discontinuity designs, difference-
in-difference (DID) matching and propensity 
score matching (PSM).  
For example, Michalek et al. (2015) combine 
the DID and PSM approach to estimate the 
extent to which investment aid under the 
RDP complements or substitutes 
investments that would be made in the 
absence of the policy. More precisely, they 
measure the deadweight loss, i.e. whether 
the investment support beneficiaries would 
have undertaken comparable investments 
even without the investment support. They 
use data on 1333 dairy farms in Germany 
for the period 2001-2008. PSM is used to 
match similar farmers based on their most 
significant characteristics, and especially on 
their probability of participating in the 
programme. The DID approach is then used 
to estimate the difference in investment 
behaviour over time between the matched 
farmers to identify the net causal effect of 
investment support. Another example of the 
use of quasi-experimental techniques with 
an application to the impact of agri-
environmental schemes in France is given at 
the end of this chapter (Illustration 1). 
Note that in some occasions, a naturally 
occurring change may be used for 
identifying causal effects, without the need 
to reconstitute a counterfactual. In such 
‘natural experiments’, the researcher takes 
advantage of a change in context or setting 
for a sample of the population that has 
occurred naturally (for example an 
unexpected abrupt change in legislation). 
Hence, natural experiments are real 
situations which resemble to experiments 
that an experimenter would have conducted 
with a control group and a test group. 
However, good natural experiments are the 
exception. While occasionally such a natural 
experiment may provide a good opportunity 
for causal impact evaluation, one cannot 
‘wait for them to happen’. They should 
therefore not be relied upon as a general 
policy evaluation tool. 
4.2 Enlarging the current CAP 
evaluation toolbox 
The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has 
experienced several reforms over the last 
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decades. In order to meet the CAP’s evolving 
objectives, the type of policy interventions 
have changed drastically. As a result, also 
the toolbox for evaluating these policies 
needs to be constantly adapted to follow 
these policy changes.  
Recent evolutions in the CAP call for 
evaluation methods (1) at the farm or even 
plot level; (2) accounting for the voluntary 
nature of many measures; (3) allowing the 
evaluation of purely regulatory measures 
(with no EU funding involved); and (4) 
flexible enough to account for the 
heterogeneity in CAP implementation across 
Member States.  
First, the targeting of support on farmers 
rather than commodities and the switch to 
decoupled payments has called for a 
change of the unit of evaluation: the farm 
rather than the market. Simulation models 
such as CAPRI were initially designed to 
estimate the market impacts and supply 
responses to changes in guaranteed prices 
and other market interventions, and are 
therefore less suited to analyse impacts at 
the farm level. In response to this concern, 
new modelling tools focusing on individual 
farm behaviour are currently being 
developed by the European Commission, to 
capture the farm-specific implementation of 
policies, as well as the heterogeneity of 
impact across farmers (Kamel Louhichi et 
al. 2015). Analysis at the plot level is also 
required to assess the environmental 
impacts of certain policies. 
Yet, typically the objective function of such 
farm-level models is often simplistic and 
limited to profit maximisation. New 
modelling challenges include the 
introduction of risk and uncertainty, and 
accounting for other behavioural factors 
that may explain heterogeneity in farm 
decision making. Yet, often information is 
missing on which behavioural factors are 
relevant or how they should be modelled. 
Experiments could help gain insights in 
developing behavioural utility functions, and 
to obtain values for important parameters 
such as risk aversion or time preferences. 
Second, an increasing number of CAP 
measures consist of farmers’ voluntary 
enrolment, such as agri-environmental 
contracts in the Rural Development Policy. 
To evaluate the efficiency of such 
measures, one needs to pay more attention 
to the drivers of individual farm decisions 
and on farmers’ motivations to participate 
in such schemes. Ex-ante evaluation should 
be able to provide information regarding the 
expected uptake of a voluntary measure, 
which types of farmers are expected to 
subscribe, and what incentives are needed 
to encourage uptake. This type of ex-ante 
information can help to fine-tune policies so 
as to obtain the desired level of 
participation, or to optimise the 
environmental outcome for a given budget.  
Third, the EC is committed to evaluate in a 
proportionate way all EU spending and non-
spending activities intended to have an 
impact on society or the economy (EC 
2015). Some aspects of agricultural policy 
are strictly regulatory, but were not 
systematically evaluated in the past. Note 
that in the regulatory area there is much 
less data available, compared to the 
detailed financial data related to spending 
activities. Data generation methods such as 
experimental approaches could have 
potential here as well. Moreover, when 
farmers receive no payments in exchange 
for complying with a set of rules (for 
example with regard to the impact of their 
activities on the environment), the 
traditional profit maximising assumption is 
not useful to understand farmers’ reaction 
to the new regulation, and to predict the 
compliance rate. Experiments allow 
capturing different objectives, such as the 
desire to comply with the rule or to behave 
like the group (social norms). 
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Last but not least, the CAP has become 
more and more diversified in its 
implementation at the Member State level 
(both in the first and second pillar). As a 
result, general EU-wide approaches will 
increasingly need to be replaced or 
complemented by more targeted 
evaluations, focusing at specific policy 
measures in specific Member States. Case-
study approaches have already been 
mobilised for the evaluation of such local 
implementations of the Rural Development 
Policy (RDP). For example, Häring et al. 
(2004) evaluate the impact of organic aid 
schemes implemented under the RDP in 
specific Member States, using a case study 
approach in 6 Member States. Experimental 
approaches can complement such 
qualitative case studies by increasing the 
internal validity of results obtained from ad-
hoc surveys. Moreover, experiments offer a 
structured evaluation tool, which allows 
replication in different contexts and the 
option to adapt them to the specificities of 
the policy and the location. This largely 
facilitates the comparison of results across 
different locations and/or Member States.  
4.3 The complementarities 
between experimental and non-
experimental approaches to 
policy evaluation 
Given this needs for innovation in the CAP 
evaluation toolbox, we argue that economic 
experiments can interestingly complement 
non-experimental methods. According to 
‘Better regulation guidelines’ (EC 2015) 
“Evaluations are based on the best available 
evidence (…), which should be drawn from a 
diverse and appropriate range of methods 
and sources (Triangulation)”. This section 
provides an overview of the important 
elements to take into account before 
selecting the best mix of methods for the 
evaluation of a specific policy.  
To shed light on the complementarity of 
experiments with other methodologies 
currently in use by policy evaluators, the 
relative advantages and limitations of 
different evaluation methods are 
summarised in Table 3. The left-hand part 
of the table summarises the non-
experimental approaches: “qualitative 
methods” are mostly based on case studies 
and qualitative comparisons of before-after 
policy implementation situations. In 
“simulation models”, we include partial and 
general equilibrium models, and 
mathematical programming tools mostly 
used for ex-ante evaluations. “Statistical & 
econometric analysis” refers mostly to ex-
post evaluations and includes quasi-
experimental approaches. Quasi-
experiments are sophisticated econometric 
methods which have been developed to 
identify the causal effect of policies from 
observational data (EC 2013b; Loi and 
Rodrigues 2012) by artificially ‘constructing’ 
or mimicking the counterfactual. They 
include the following empirical strategies: 
instrumental variables estimations, 
regression discontinuity designs, difference-
in-difference matching and propensity score 
matching.  
The comparison is based on three criteria: 
the objective of the evaluation; the trade-
off between causality and generalizability 
(i.e. internal and external validity); and the 
practical challenges in data collection and 
analysis. The performance indicators (low, 
medium, high) in Table 3 are just indications 
of relative performance across 
methodologies and criteria. They are 
debatable since each column refers to very 
heterogeneous evaluation studies. Overall, 
the assessment of the relative global 
performance of the different methods 
depends on the weight attributed to each of 
the selection criterion.  
Finally, we have selected three examples to 
illustrate the complementarities across 
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approaches, both between experimental and 
non-experimental methods (illustration 1), 
between experimental and quasi-
experimental approaches (illustration 2) and 
between two types of experiments 
(illustration 3). 
4.3.1 Objective of the evaluation 
Depending on the main objective of the 
evaluation task, different methods may be 
appropriate or may need to be combined. 
We identify the ability of the different 
methods (1) to test a policy prior to 
implementation (ex-ante evaluation); (2) to 
measure the net impact of a policy (ex-post 
evaluation) and (3) to understand farmers’ 
reactions to policy in the presence of 
behavioural factors.  
For ex-ante evaluations, experimental data 
and simulation models are highly 
complementary. Simulation models are 
clearly more useful when assessing broad 
policy reforms, such as reducing price 
support or abolishing production quotas at 
the EU-level. Yet, when it comes to new 
policies that are very different from existing 
ones (e.g. launch of a conservation auction, 
introduction of novel insurance tools), it 
may be difficult for simulation models to 
make realistic assumptions as to the 
impacts of those policy changes on farmer 
behaviour. Nevertheless, economic 
experiments may provide some insights as 
to what response to expect. For example, 
the DCE related to the introduction of the 
greening provisions of the CAP (Schulz et al. 
2014) informs policy makers of farmers’ 
likely responses to this new element of the 
CAP.  
When it comes to targeted policy 
interventions (on specific farm types or in a 
limited number of regions), simulation 
models are not the most appropriate 
method given the cost of making the model 
flexible enough to capture policy 
specificities at regional or individual level 
and because of the lack of data to feed 
such a model.  
Qualitative assessment based on 
stakeholders’ interviews in a number of 
carefully selected case studies can provide 
useful insights there, but economic 
experiments can offer more robust 
evidence. For example, DCE can help assess 
how farmers would respond in aggregate to 
different designs, but also how responses 
might differ among different types of 
farmers.  
RCT can provide a powerful tool for ex ante 
analysis in the form of pilot programmes: 
provided proper randomisation has been set 
in place, the causal impact of a specific 
policy programme can be reliably assessed 
before scaling it up to the entire population. 
On the contrary, RCT are not suitable to test 
broad policy reforms (Goldin et al. 2012; 
Rodrik 2008). For example, in the case of 
market price interventions it is simply 
impossible to exclude a (random) part of the 
population from the policy. RCT can 
therefore be useful to test specific policy 
programmes in a specific context, but 
cannot offer an evaluation of broad or 
wide-ranging policy reforms.10  
Also, when behavioural drivers of farmers’ 
responses to policy are important, 
simulation models may need some input 
from experimental data. Field experiments 
can help elicit farmers’ preferences and 
behavioural parameters (e.g. risk aversion, 
time preferences), which can then be 
plugged into simulation models. With 
respect to policy measures with voluntary 
enrolment, the review of the literature 
                                              
10
 Opponents of experimentation usually claim that 
biased answers to big explanatory questions are more 
important than unbiased answers to smaller casual-
descriptive questions (Plott 1989). 
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above clearly illustrated the usefulness of 
all types of economic experiments in an ex-
ante evaluation perspective.  
When considering the ex-post evaluation of 
policy impacts, statistical analysis of 
observational data and RCT can provide 
reliable estimates of the impact of a policy 
or programme. Yet, they usually provide 
limited information on the reasons 
underlying the outcomes. When it comes to 
understanding why a policy did not work as 
expected and how to improve it, qualitative 
methods based on stakeholders’ 
perceptions, and discrete choice, lab or field 
experiments are often more useful. Indeed, 
understanding the impact of a policy 
requires analysing both the results of the 
decisions taken by farmers in response to 
the policy (as can be observed from micro-
level data such as FADN), but also to 
understand the factors underlying such 
decisions and behaviours. Experiments can 
help explain unanticipated effects of the 
policy or intervention (Gneezy and Rustichini 
2000). For example, DCE allow analysing in 
detail the mechanism of farmers’ response 
to a programme, to explain low participation 
rates in schemes that have failed to attract 
the envisaged numbers of farmers despite 
high financial incentives. Hence, choice data 
will enable the analyst not only to identify 
the obstacles to participation but also to 
devise effective remedies. 
4.3.2 Trade-off between causality and 
generalizability 
The second key issue in the selection of 
evaluation methods is the trade-off 
between internal validity and external 
validity of the evaluation results. Internal 
validity or causality reflects the extent to 
which the causal relation between two 
variables (for example the policy and the 
outcome) is properly demonstrated. External 
validity or generalizability refers both to the 
ability to transfer the results to the real 
world and to other contexts. While both 
internal and external validity are desired, 
the evaluator is usually confronted with a 
trade-off (Roe and Just 2009).  
Qualitative methods have a low internal 
validity, since they generally do not allow 
the analyst to conclude decisively whether 
the observed changes are due to the policy. 
Their external validity can be high, if the 
relevant key stakeholders are interviewed. 
Nevertheless, stakeholders’ stated 
preferences and future intentions (before a 
policy is implemented) or perceptions of 
what has happened (ex-post) can be biased 
and misreported (strategic bias) or not. 
Moreover, qualitative methods are often 
applied in a case study setting, and the 
transferability of findings to a different 
context is dependent on the specificities of 
the case studies.  
As long as representative and carefully 
collected data are used, statistical analysis 
of observational data presents high external 
validity. It may be difficult, however, to 
establish internal validity when the analyst 
suspects that unobserved variables may 
have affected outcomes. Michalek et al. 
(2015) provide an example of how 
sophisticated, quasi-experimental 
econometric techniques can be used to 
estimate the net impact of investment 
support under the CAP’s Rural Development 
Policy based on FADN data, but such 
techniques require detailed databases and 
cannot always provide a convincing solution. 
On the contrary, random assignment of the 
participants to the different treatments and 
high control of the decision-making 
environment, as used in most economic 
experiments, allow the researcher to 
prevent systematic differences in treatment 
and control groups and to limit any 
concurrent third elements that could 
confound the outcome.  
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However, this strong internal validity comes 
at the cost of reduced external validity, 
especially for lab experiments in an abstract 
setting. Indeed, the choices that individuals 
make in the lab depend not just on financial 
implications, but also on the particular 
context in which a decision is embedded, 
and the manner in which participants are 
selected to participate. Because the lab 
systematically differs from most naturally 
occurring environments on these 
dimensions, experiments may not always 
yield results that are readily generalizable 
(Levitt and List 2007a). Their abstract 
setting limits the ability to generalise the 
results isolated in the lab to real situations 
where the context is important. Likewise, 
results obtained with students may not 
generalise to the targeted population (see 
box 2). Hence, the ability to transfer 
conclusions from the lab to the real world 
may be low. 
Box 2: Why running economic 
experiments with students? 
In many experimental studies, the first step 
consists of running lab experiments with 
students. At first glance, policy makers may 
be reluctant to use lab experiments for 
policy evaluation. But there are several good 
reasons for that: 
First, there are some practical challenges in 
setting up experiments with stakeholders. 
Most field experiments require having a 
fixed number of participants taking part in 
the experiment simultaneously and in the 
same room. Of course, this is far easier to 
organise with students than with busy 
professionals.  
Second, starting with lab experiments is 
useful because if it does not work as 
anticipated in the lab, then it is very likely to 
fail in a field application as well (Plott 
1997).  
Third, the way in which people behave is, to 
a certain extent and in certain domains, 
common across humans. Some findings on 
the biases and heuristics have been 
replicated over time and across domains, 
and can safely be assumed to be valid for 
any population (van Bavel, Rodríguez-Priego, 
and Maghiros 2015).  
Nevertheless, the lab experiment literature 
suggests that care should be taken in 
extrapolating the results obtained from 
people who have very little experience with 
the types of decisions being studied (e.g. 
students) to the real population under study 
(e.g. famers).  
Many studies have shown that: (i) people 
tend to behave more rationally the higher 
the financial stakes; (ii) students sometimes 
behave differently than experienced market 
participants; (iii) the altruism observed in 
laboratory experiments sometimes 
disappears in naturally occurring markets or, 
on the contrary, more cooperation is 
observed within the real population under 
study than students; and (iv) even highly 
knowledgeable and experienced individuals 
can act irrationally in laboratory settings 
because of the artificial way choices are 
framed (List and Lucking-Reiley, 2002; 
Alevy et al., 2007; Levitt and List, 2007; 
Bchir, 2014). 
On the other hand, lab experiments are 
typically very easy to replicate because of 
the high degree of control over the 
experiment. This allows testing in how far 
laboratory results are valid in different 
contexts (different countries or regions for 
example). 
Field experiments, RCT and DCE present a 
compromise. They lessen the inherent 
tension between establishing causality and 
the generalizability of results. Field 
experiments give in some control compared 
to lab experiments, when the experimental 
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design does not allow controlling for the 
numerous factors that are at work in the 
field; but results are likely to be more 
representative of real-world decision-
making. Moreover, even when field 
experiments are usually conducted on 
limited samples, they constitute a 
structured evaluation tool, which allows 
replication in different contexts or with 
other participants to test the generalizability 
of the results. This facilitates comparison of 
results across different farm types and/or 
Member States. As such, field experiments 
provide a bridge between lab and 
observational data (List, 2007, 2011). A 
combination of lab experiments with small-
scale field experiments can ensure both the 
correctness and relevance of the results for 
policy-making. 
Since DCEs rely on stated instead of 
revealed preferences, they may suffer from 
a lower internal validity than lab 
experiments. However, because respondents 
are typically drawn from the targeted 
population and scenarios proposed are 
usually as close as possible to what could 
be observed in reality, external validity may 
be higher than in an artificial laboratory 
setting with students. The ability to 
extrapolate DCE results to other contexts 
can nevertheless be limited if the survey 
(e.g. the set and level of attributes) is 
designed to fit a specific context.  
Finally, the RCT methodology combines high 
internal validity (thanks to randomisation) 
and high transferability of results to the real 
world since data come from the natural 
environment and stakes are real, in contrast 
to lab and field experiments which are 
merely games. RCT are therefore often 
referred to as the “gold standard” to 
measure the net impact of a specific 
programme. However, external validity in 
the sense of transferability of results to a 
different context or country, or even to a 
larger scale, may be limited, especially 
when the policy response is much 
dependent on specific local factors or when 
general equilibrium effects play a role 
(Deaton, 2010). 
4.3.3 Practical implementation  
The choice of an evaluation method is also 
often affected by practical issues, due to 
time and budget constraints. Other criteria 
might therefore also be important in the 
choice of an evaluation method, such as the 
ease of access to data or data collection 
(cost and time), and the ease of 
interpretation of evaluation results by policy 
makers. 
Any method requiring the collection of new 
data will generate additional budget costs 
and delays. Since the common feature of all 
economic experiments is that data must be 
generated under a controlled process, it is 
expected that they engender greater hassle 
and data-related costs than simulation 
models and econometric analysis exploiting 
existing EU-wide databases such as FADN 
or Eurostat data.  
The time, difficulty and costs involved in 
collecting observational data or generating 
experimental data vary greatly. Collection of 
qualitative data from stakeholders in a case 
study, or experimental data collected in a 
discrete choice, lab or field experiment, is 
usually faster since it involves fairly small 
sample sizes. For randomised controlled 
trials, the establishment of the baseline 
situation and the preparation of the 
experimental set-up is often a costly and 
time-consuming precondition for effective 
experimentation, especially since it may 
require specific authorization by Member 
States or by European authorities. 
The ease of interpretation of results can 
also make some evaluation methods more 
attractive than others. Experimental results 
are often easier to interpret than the results 
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from statistical methods or complex 
simulation models. As indicated by Burtless 
(1995), “the simplicity of experiments offers 
notable advantages in making results 
convincing […] and understandable to 
policymakers.” Qualitative data are also 
easy to interpret since they require limited 
technical knowledge, although drawing a 
conclusion from numerous interviews with a 
diverse pool of stakeholders does not 
always allow a straightforward 
interpretation. 
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Table 3: Comparison of different methods according to the objective of the evaluation and the implementation constraints 
 Empirical approaches using observational data Experimental approaches 
 
Qualitative methods Simulation models 
Statistical & Econometric 
analysis 
RCT 
Field  
experiment 
Lab  
experiment 
DCE 
M
a
in
 o
b
je
ct
iv
e 
o
f 
th
e 
ev
a
lu
a
ti
o
n 
Testing a policy prior to implementation (ex-ante) 
Medium High Low High (pilot) High High High 
Measuring the net impact of a specific policy (ex-post) 
Low Low 
Medium  
(using quasi-experiment) 
High Low Low Low 
Understanding farmers' reactions to policy in the presence of behavioural factors 
Medium Low Low Low High High High 
        
Tr
a
d
e-
o
ff
 b
et
w
ee
n
 t
h
e 
in
te
rn
a
l 
a
n
d
 e
xt
er
n
a
l 
va
lid
it
y 
Ability to identify causality 
Low 
Not relevant 
(causal effects are 
assumed) 
Medium High Medium High Medium 
Ability to transfer the results to the real world 
Medium 
(depending on accuracy of stated 
preference) 
High High High 
Medium 
(depending on 
realism of the task) 
Low 
Medium 
(depending on accuracy of 
stated preference) 
Ability to extrapolate results to other contexts/people 
Low 
High 
(depending on model 
coverage) 
High 
(depending on data source) 
Medium Medium 
Low, but 
easy to replicate 
Medium 
        
P
ra
ct
ic
a
l 
im
pl
em
en
ta
ti
o
n
 Ease of access to data or data collection 
Medium High High Low Medium High Medium 
Ease of results’ interpretation by policy officers 
Medium  
(subjectivity of qualitative data) 
Low Low High High High High 
Source: Inspired by Roe & Just (2009, fig.1 p.1268), extended and adapted for agricultural policy evaluation.  
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Illustration 1: Predicting EU farms' 
compliance to greening requirements: 
Simulation models versus DCE 
The policy evaluation question 
In the CAP 2014-2020, the greening 
payment rewards farmers for respecting 
three mandatory agricultural practices, 
namely maintenance of permanent 
grassland, presence of ecological focus area 
and crop diversification. Farmers’ 
compliance with these requirements is 
expected to depend upon individual 
preferences and compliance costs. Before 
the European Commission formulated the 
final proposal and before the final vote of 
the CAP reform was made, the following ex-
ante evaluation question was raised: how 
will EU farmers respond to the greening 
policy?  
We present here the design and results of 
two studies which allow for the ex-ante 
assessment of the impact of greening: a 
simulation model and a discrete choice 
experiment. 
Assessment of different evaluation 
methods  
Simulation model  
Louhichi et al (2015) developed an EU-wide 
Individual Farm Model for CAP Analysis 
(IFM-CAP) to simulate the effects of the 
crop diversification requirement on land use 
and farmers’ income. The model is run for 
every single individual farm of the FADN 
database, therefore covering all main 
agricultural production activities and 
reflecting the heterogeneity of EU farms. 
Simulation results show that most farms 
choose to comply with the crop 
diversification requirement due to the 
sizable penalty imposed. Yet, the number of 
farms affected by the crop diversification 
measure is small and, although some 
farmers are more affected than others, the 
overall effect on farm income is very 
limited.  
This simulation approach offers a holistic 
representation of the farm economic 
system but, as any simulation model, its 
results depend on specific assumptions. 
Farmers are assumed to maximise income 
and to be risk-neutral, land is assumed to 
be reallocated only within and not between 
farms, and several assumptions on supply 
elasticities, input cost etc. must be made. 
One of the advantages of such simulation 
models is that, once the model is calibrated, 
evaluation results can be obtained and 
compared rapidly, since it is relatively fast 
to run simulations. The simulation can also 
easily be applied at the EU-wide level. In 
addition, this type of simulation model 
allows the analyst to test various 
alternative scenarios and to evaluate the 
intended effect of a programme at its 
design stage. Finally, simulation models 
allow attributing the simulated impact to 
different underlying mechanisms (at least 
as far as these mechanisms are considered 
in the model set-up).  
Discrete Choice Experiment 
Schulz et al (2014) assess farmers' 
willingness to comply with the greening 
requirements using a DCE conducted with 
128 German farmers. This study, presented 
in section 3.1.2, identifies the variables 
affecting the likelihood to comply with 
greening requirements and analyses in 
particular the impact of different designs of 
the ecological focus area measure.  
The main advantage of the DCE over the 
simulation model approach is that no 
behavioural assumptions must be made. In 
the DCE survey, the respondent chooses 
his/her best option according to his/her 
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preferences. Both extrinsic (e.g. complying 
costs, level of green payment) and intrinsic 
(e.g. personal preferences and social norms) 
motivations are taken into account. 
Moreover, the DCE allows exploring the 
heterogeneity of preferences among 
farmers. However, a limitation lies in 
extrapolating the results from a small 
localised DCE to the EU-wide level. The 
experiment should be repeated on a larger 
sample and in different Member States to 
obtain results valid at the EU level.  
In both methods, we don’t know how 
farmers would react with real stakes. 
Farmers’ decisions are simulated based on 
modellers’ assumptions and on calibrated 
data in the first case and farmers make 
hypothetical choices which have no real 
impact in the DCE. Yet, this is a limitation 
shared by most ex-ante evaluation 
methods, except if a pilot is conducted, for 
example through a small-scale RCT. 
 
Illustration 2: Evaluating the impact of 
agri-environmental schemes (AES): 
quasi-experiment versus RCT 
The policy evaluation question 
Agri-environmental schemes are voluntary 
contracts where farmers receive a payment 
in return for adopting environmentally 
friendly farming practices. The advantage 
of the voluntary approach is that the 
contracted farmers are supposedly those 
with the lowest compliance costs, therefore 
reducing the total cost to reach the 
environmental objective. However, an AES is 
effective only if it has an additional effect 
on farmers’ adoption of environmentally 
friendly practices. Paying for practices that 
would have been adopted even in the 
absence of the AES is called a “windfall 
effect”. It increases the cost of the policy 
and has no additional effect on the 
environment. Such environmental 
improvements that would have been made 
by farmers anyway should be excluded 
when measuring the net impact of the 
policy. 
Assessment of different evaluation 
methods  
Quasi-experimental approaches 
Chabé-Ferret and Subervie (2013) estimate 
the net impact of five AES in France, one of 
which is a subsidy for planting cover crops. 
The evaluation aims to compare the surface 
of cover crops grown by farmers having 
signed an AES contract (the treated) and 
the surface of cover crops they would have 
planted in the absence of the AES (the 
counterfactual). A simple comparison of the 
situation before the AES (in 2000) and after 
the AES (in 2005) would be biased given 
that the surface of cover crops increased 
over time (Figure 2). Besides, volunteer 
farmers who contract AES are not similar to 
those not contracting (see untreated and 
observed before 2000 in Figure 2). Thus, 
approximating the counterfactual by the 
group of farmers who did not engage in 
AES would lead to an overestimation of the 
impact of the AES on the planting of cover 
crops, due to the selection bias. 
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The authors rely on a quasi-experimental 
approach, namely difference-in-difference 
(DID) matching, to estimate the average 
treatment effect on the treated (ATT). The 
method relies on matching each engaged 
farmer (treated) with a farmer not engaged 
(untreated) but with characteristics similar 
to those that did engage. While DID-
matching is a powerful technique to 
measure the net impact of a policy, they do 
require appropriate data and the estimation 
techniques require some specific 
assumptions to be fulfilled. 
Randomised Control Trial 
What would be the advantages of a RCT 
over the use of quasi-experimental 
techniques based on observational data? 
Randomisation of beneficiaries would allow 
computing an unbiased estimate of the net 
impact of the policy without the need to 
rely on assumptions as with quasi-
experimental techniques. Second, the policy 
impact (ATT) is obtained through a simple 
comparison of means, without the need to 
rely on complex estimation/matching 
techniques. However, RCT also have limits 
and raise practical challenges. For instance, 
it might be politically difficult to offer the 
AES programme only to a subsample of the 
population and to refuse enrolment to the 
rest of the population that would like to 
enter. To overcome this problem, proposals 
of “close-to-random” experimental designs 
are proposed in chapter 5. 
Illustration 3: Can contracts with a 
collective dimension improve AES 
enrolment and efficiency? DCE versus 
laboratory experiment  
The policy evaluation question 
By providing incentives for groups of 
farmers to enrol in AES (for example by 
making the financial incentive dependent on 
a minimum share of farmers enrolled), a 
dynamic of change can potentially be 
initiated, and this could increase 
participation. However, at first sight this 
may not seem to be the right solution to 
reduce AES expenditures since it may lead 
to increased payments to farmers, unless 
farmers’ preferences for such contract 
result in farmers willing to participate for 
lower individual payments. Whether 
introducing a collective dimension in AES 
contract would increase the effectiveness 
of the scheme has been tested with two 
different experimental approaches. 
Assessment of different evaluation 
methods  
Discrete Choice Experiment 
In Kuhfuss et al (2014), farmers’ 
preferences for a bonus conditional on the 
achievement of a collective enrolment 
target in an AES were measured using a 
DCE, conducted on a sample of 317 wine-
growers in Languedoc Roussillon (South 
East of France). Through a web survey, 
respondents were invited to select their 
preferred herbicide-reduction contract in 
different choice sets (Figure 3). One of the 
attributes of the contract was a bonus of 
150€/ha of enrolled land, conditional on 
50% of the area of the target territory 
Figure 2: Selection and time trend biases 
Source: Chabé-Ferret and Subervie (2013) 
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being enrolled at the end of the 5-year 
contract duration. This conditional bonus 
would be paid in addition to the usual 
payment at the end of the contract. 
The analysis of farmers’ stated choices 
showed that introducing a conditional bonus 
improved the probability to enrol and, for 
equivalent environmental effort intensity, it 
reduced the individual willingness to accept 
compensation for signing a contract by an 
amount which, on average, was six times 
greater than the expected amount of the 
bonus. Overall, the cost-effectiveness of the 
AES would therefore be enhanced with a 
collective bonus. 
Figure 3: Example of choice card  
  
Source: Kuhfuss et al (2014)
Laboratory experiment 
Le Coent et al (2014) examine a similar 
type of conditional incentive using a 
decontextualized laboratory experiment 
with 220 students in the University of 
Montpellier (France). This experiment 
compares the effectiveness and efficiency 
of two types of incentive mechanisms: 
contracts with individual payments 
proportional to individual environmental 
efforts (similar to existing AES) and 
contracts with the same individual 
payments but conditional on the attainment 
of a collective threshold of environmental 
efforts. This mechanism presents the 
obvious advantage of spending public 
money only if the environmental threshold 
is reached, but it entails more risks for the 
contractors of the AES than the contract 
with a conditional bonus, where the 
individual basic payment is paid even if the 
threshold is not reached (Kuhfuss et al., 
2014). To avoid biases due to participants’ 
attitudes about environmental issues, the 
experiment was “context-free”: neutral 
language was used and the individual 
environmental effort was framed as a 
financial contribution to a public good. The 
results of the experiment show that the 
incentive payments with collective 
conditionality improve efficiency and 
effectiveness of AES.  
Although relying on two different types of 
experiments, both studies suggest that 
conditional financial incentives may interact 
with individual preferences for collective 
effort and could contribute to improved 
enrolment without increasing expenditure.  
The main advantage of the lab experiment 
is the high control over the participants’ 
environment and therefore the high internal 
validity of the result. It allows concluding 
that indeed people act differently when a 
payment is conditional on a collective 
threshold (although according to theoretical 
predictions they should not). Because of the 
decontextualized settings, the lab 
experiment thus comes to a general 
observation on human behaviour. However, 
the lab experiment cannot guarantee that 
farmers would react similarly to conditional 
incentives applied to AES. 
The external validity of the results of the 
DCE, which was conducted with farmers 
with explicit reference to agri-
environmental contracts, is expected to be 
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higher. However, in contrast to participants 
in the lab experiment who faced real 
financial stakes, respondents to the DCE 
were only providing hypothetical answers, 
since respondents were not paid according 
to their choices. The different strengths and 
limits of these two experimental 
approaches illustrate their complementarity. 
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5 Practical challenges when 
implementing economic 
experiments  
 
When opening the policy evaluation toolbox 
for experimental approaches, one needs to 
be aware of a number of limitations, 
practical issues and constraints related to 
the implementation of experimental 
methods. This chapter describes the main 
practical issues associated with the setting 
up of experiments: sampling and 
recruitment of participants (5.1); 
assignment of participants to the different 
treatments (5.2); social acceptability and 
institutional constraints (5.3); other 
organisational challenges and related costs 
(5.4 and 5.5);   
The objectives of this rather technical 
discussion on the implementation of 
experiments are twofold: First, to provide 
information for evaluators wishing to 
implement experimental approaches. 
Second, to make policy officers, who plan to 
commission evaluation studies, aware of 
these practical difficulties in order to help 
them conduct a critical analysis of the 
proposed methods. For more general advice 
on conducting behavioural studies, the 
interested reader can have a look at the JRC 
report “Seven Points to Remember when 
Conducting Behavioural Studies in Support 
of EU Policy-making” (van Bavel, Rodríguez-
Priego, and Maghiros 2015). 
5.1 Sampling 
The first concern of any evaluator is to 
make sure the group under study (here the 
participants in an experiment) is 
representative of the population of interest 
in order to ensure that results can be 
generalised to the entire population. EU 
policy officers will also often aim for results 
that are valid across Europe rather than 
being limited to one country (van Bavel, 
Rodríguez-Priego, and Maghiros 2015).  
Note that sample selection is not an 
additional problem for experiments 
compared to traditional surveys. The same 
sample selection problem exists in any 
survey method. Still, the fact that not all 
experiments can be run via the internet or 
at respondents’ home may be an extra 
difficulty compared to traditional surveys. 
For laboratory experiments conducted with 
students, the risk of selection bias is fairly 
well controlled thanks to the generally large 
number of participants and to the 
sophisticated and normalised recruitment 
procedures followed by most experimental 
laboratories.  
However, this issue is more problematic for 
field and discrete choice experiments, 
especially when conducted with farmers. It 
is very difficult to constitute a sample of 
farmers who accept to participate in an 
experiment without departing from the rules 
of randomisation. Randomisation for 
experiments run with farmers requires that 
an up-to-date list of farmers in the region 
of interest be available to the experimenter 
who can pick participants at random on the 
list provided. This is rarely the case since 
national administrative and statistical 
services are reluctant to supply this 
information for privacy protection reasons 
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and authorization procedures are often 
slow.  
Experimenters therefore tend to resort to 
other recruitment procedures, for example 
through calls for participation in magazines 
or newsletters read by the population under 
study (for example farmers), or through the 
network of farm advisors. These methods 
do not preclude the risk of self-selection. 
Even if efforts are made to invite farmers 
to participate on a random basis, one can 
suspect that their willingness to participate 
in an experiment is correlated with variables 
such as their familiarity with administrative 
or technical staff, their interest in policy-
making, their time availability etc. which 
makes them statistically different from the 
population of interest and introduces what 
is known as a “self-selection” bias.  
With RCTs, the cases of self-selection bias 
are less frequent since participation is 
usually imposed by the experimental design. 
In order to facilitate randomisation, the unit 
of randomisation can be moved from the 
individual level to the institution level – e.g. 
farm advisory services – or at geographical 
level – e.g. villages or regions. 
Overall, achieving a sample that is 
representative of all EU farmers in the 28 
Member States with the use of experimental 
methodology is generally not feasible within 
existing budget constraints. Moreover, the 
comparisons of results from experiments 
replicated in several regions or Member 
States is not straightforward if the selection 
bias is of different nature in the different 
contexts. One may therefore reconsider the 
search for “representativeness” (see 6.1.2).  
5.2 Assignment bias 
When the experimental approach requires 
setting up sub-groups receiving different 
treatments (lab and field experiments, 
RCTs), particular attention must be paid to 
the procedure assigning participants to 
treatment and control groups. To ensure 
that the average effect of the programme 
or policy measure under study is properly 
measured, it is necessary that the treated 
group and the control group have the same 
observed and unobserved characteristics 
before the treatment. Assume for example 
an RCT conducted to evaluate farm advisory 
service policies. Farmers are selected to 
benefit from a tailored individualised 
technical support programme. The objective 
is to measure whether such policy can 
improve the take up of innovations at the 
farm level. However, if selected farmers are 
systematically more skilled or are more 
prone to take risks than farmers of the 
control group, the probability that they 
adopt innovations is greater even in the 
absence of the individualised technical 
support programme.  
Randomisation at the assignment stage is a 
way to guarantee that the assignment of 
participants either to treatment groups or to 
control groups is not correlated to any of 
their characteristics that could affect the 
outcomes of the experiment. If random 
assignment is not correctly done, 
experiments may overestimate the impact 
of the policy (Berriet-Solliec et al., 2014).  
The ideal procedure to ensure correct 
randomisation is to use assignment 
concealment techniques: the investigator in 
charge of contacting potential participants 
is not aware of the procedure allocating 
participants to one group or another and 
does not take part in the assignment 
decision procedure (Jaddad and Enkin, 
2007). 
When it is not always possible to guarantee 
that assignment is purely random, for 
example when each treated participant 
remains free to choose to enrol in the 
programme or not (e.g. voluntary AES), the 
experimenter will have to ensure that the 
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actual take-up of the proposed programme 
does match the assignment plan, even if 
this requires enlarging the pool of 
participants.  
If sampling and assignment are not 
correctly done, the study can yield 
misleading conclusions: results should not 
be generalised to the overall population, or 
measured effects will systematically 
overestimate or underestimate the true 
causal effect of the intervention. Being 
aware of these risks of bias helps interpret 
the results with caution.  
5.3 Potential ethical concerns and 
close-to-random procedures 
In a lab or field experiment, not all 
participants will receive the same amount 
of money. In particular, participants who are 
assigned to the control group may miss the 
opportunity to make extra money on top of 
the show-up fee offered to all participants.11 
However, experiments often include “within” 
procedures in which a participant is 
successively assigned to a control group 
and then to a treatment group. In any case, 
participants are not told the gains of other 
participants, and their decisions in the 
experiment remain anonymous (the 
experimenter cannot link the outcome of an 
experiment to the name of the participant). 
These precautions preclude inter-personal 
comparisons and evaluations of the 
individuals’ performance by the 
experimenter.  
The case of RCT is more controversial 
because treatment is effective: assignment 
can create ethical problems since it means 
                                              
11
 The ethical code of conduct of lab and field 
experimentalists requires that all participants get a 
fee covering their transport expenses and 
opportunity cost of time. 
that treatment is made available to some 
(the treated group) and denied to others 
(the control group) (box 3). Many authors 
have thus questioned fairness and morality 
of RCTs (see Baele (2013) for a review). 
Obviously such ethical concerns are more 
crucial when RCTs evaluate health 
treatments (since it directly affects the 
possibility to be cured) than when they 
evaluate the impact of agricultural policy 
measures. Of course, those who are denied 
access to a specific agricultural support 
programme may feel disadvantaged. Note 
however, that this situation also arises 
under other circumstances, for example due 
to different administrative procedures in 
various regions or due to budget constraints 
which may impose a first-come, first-serve 
allocation.  
However, unequal access to policy may be 
challenged in court or by European 
competition policies when the trial creates 
undue inequity between citizens (for 
example if it is a subsidy program). This 
problem can be particularly problematic in 
the European agricultural sector since the 
CAP edicts fairly strict rules (especially on 
first pillar’s payments) to avoid competition 
distortions across European farmers. Indeed, 
experimental programmes may require 
notification to obtain approval by the 
relevant European Commission services. 
This in turn slows down initiatives to launch 
experimental pilot programmes to evaluate 
the likely impact of innovative CAP 
measures. 
Box 3: Some thoughts on experiments 
and moral issues 
In response to those who are tempted to 
reject experiments on ethical grounds, John 
List (2011), an eminent professor in 
experimental economics, gives the following 
arguments:  
 59 
 
“Why it is not fair to only give a fraction of 
the population a potentially beneficial 
treatment? First of all, it only considers 
contemporaneous trade-offs. One could 
easily argue that it is not fair to future 
generations to bypass learning opportunities 
that could make them better off. I am 
personally glad that earlier generations 
executed experiments to determine the 
efficacy of promising drugs so that today 
my father’s heart condition can be treated 
appropriately. Second, even if one insists on 
everyone receiving treatment, it remains 
possible to execute an experiment whereby 
people receive treatment in waves over 
time.” 
Recent works, especially in the development 
literature, have innovated in many different 
ways to introduce randomisation into 
existing programmes with minimal 
disruption. Duflo et al. (2007), Shadish et al. 
(2002) and Morawetz (2014) have 
described “close to random” procedures, 
that can be used to introduce some 
randomisation elements in experiments 
(and therefore reduce the selection bias) 
without jeopardising acceptance compared 
to pure randomisation.  
 Randomisation as part of a pilot 
project: Small-scale pilot 
implementation of policy interventions, 
in which in an initial phase only a small 
number of people benefit from the 
policy, after which it will be extended, 
may face similar ethical concerns as 
RCT, but seem to be more acceptable. 
Hence, framing an RCT as a pilot clearly 
indicates the future extension of the 
optimised policy, which may contribute 
to increasing its acceptability. This first 
close-to-random procedure consists of 
randomly offering farmers to participate 
in a pilot study before the measure is 
implemented at full scale. Those not 
participating at the beginning serve as 
the control group; in the end all farmers 
will be subject to the same policy 
measure.  
 During the phase-in of a 
programme: A similar procedure 
consists of applying the treatment to 
participants in successive waves. 
Financial and administrative constraints 
can lead to phasing-in of programmes 
over time, and randomisation can be 
argued to provide the fairest way of 
determining the order of phase-in. 
Randomising the order of phase-in can 
allow evaluation of programme effects 
in contexts where it is not acceptable for 
some groups or individuals to receive no 
support. The starting point is random 
and, until all participate, the difference 
between participants and non-
participants can be measured. Note that 
this design may be problematic when 
the control group is affected by the 
expectation of future participation, in 
which case it does not constitute a valid 
counterfactual. 
 Over-subscription: A natural 
opportunity for introducing 
randomisation occurs when there are 
limited resources or implementation 
capacities and demand for a programme 
or service exceeds supply. In this case, a 
natural and fair way to ration resources 
is to select those who will receive the 
programme by lottery among eligible 
candidates. 
 Encouragement design: Rather than 
randomising over the treatment itself, 
participants are randomly assigned to 
an encouragement to receive the 
treatment. For example, a random 
sample of farmers receives by mail an 
information campaign to participate in a 
programme. The farms targeted by the 
campaign are more likely to participate 
in the programme than others. However, 
because the encouragement only 
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increases the probability that a 
treatment is received without changing 
it from zero to one, encouragement 
designs pose specific analytical 
challenges. Very briefly, having received 
an invitation to participate is used as a 
natural instrumental variable with which 
to evaluate the impact of the treatment 
(see Duflo et al. (2007) for more 
details).  
 Free-lunch randomisation (Morawetz, 
2014): From all farms that are eligible 
to participate in a programme, a lottery 
selects free-lunch farms. These free-
lunch farms are beneficiaries from the 
programme, irrespectively of whether 
they comply with the requirements 
(think for example of an agri-
environmental measure) and 
irrespectively of whether they decided to 
apply for the measure. This lottery is to 
be held when the application for 
participation in the programme is 
opened but before the programme 
starts, in order to leave time to inform 
the free-lunch farms that they do not 
have to comply with the requirements of 
the AEM even though they receive the 
full payment. Such a design allows 
comparing the outcome for the 
participant in the programme and the 
free-lunch farms that were applying, but 
were drawn in the lottery. 
5.4 Strategic biases  
Evaluation bias can result from the fact that 
being part of an evaluation can change 
behaviour. Such strategic bias arises when 
participants anticipate that their responses 
or observed behaviour will have an impact 
on future policy choices and they wish to 
manipulate the outcomes of the experiment 
by adopting an insincere behaviour. Another 
example of evaluation bias is the 
‘Hawthorne effect’, when the treatment 
group works harder than normal or the 
‘John Henry effect’ when the control group 
starts competing with the treatment group. 
There may also be a “warm glow bias” when 
the participants are informed on the 
purpose of the study and change their 
behaviour in response to their perception of 
what the evaluator is trying to test.  
Each of these biases can affect the 
reliability of results and may limit the 
possibility to compare results across studies 
because such biases are often group or 
context-dependent.  
Controlling for such biases requires the 
design of the experiment to be carefully 
done and, when possible, participants not to 
be made aware of their participation in an 
experiment. While this is possible for RCTs, 
it is more difficult for choice, lab and field 
experiments. Increasing incentives or 
making the experimental tasks/surveys less 
prone to manipulation by participants are 
also a way of limiting this risk.  
5.5 Costs and organisational 
issues  
Experiments are often thought to be 
expensive methods, although this is not 
necessarily the case. The costs and length 
of the experiment vary widely from one 
experiment to another, depending on the 
scope of the study and the type of 
experimental design. As a general rule of 
thumb, laboratory experiments can be 
expected to be cheaper and yield more rapid 
results than field experiments and discrete 
choice experiments, whereas RCTs often 
display the most costly and time-consuming 
set-up. It should also be noticed that, while 
experimental approaches imply costs of 
data collection, data analysis is relatively 
quick and therefore cheap, compared to 
econometric analyses or simulations based 
on observational data. 
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Laboratory experiments are a widespread 
technique (there are more than 70 
economic laboratories in the European 
Union12). Most labs have a Charter of Ethics 
which describes the rules of good scientific 
practices in experimental research. Amongst 
others, it is often stipulated, both on ethical 
and efficiency grounds, that average 
expected revenue of participating students 
should be aligned with the opportunity cost 
of their time. The payment to the 
participants usually consists of two 
elements: a fixed show-up fee, 
corresponding to the minimum guaranteed 
payoff to all participants, and the payment 
corresponding to the performance/decisions 
taken in the game. For European students, it 
is estimated that it requires an expected 
gain of 10 to 15 €/ hour plus show-up fees 
of 2 to 8€. The number of observations 
necessary to obtain robust estimations 
depends on the design and research 
question. On average, a lab experiment is 
run with 100 to 400 participants and can 
cost between 2500 and 10000 €.  
Switching from the lab to the field can 
reveal itself more adventurous and more 
costly for several reasons.  
First, participants’ gains must be revised 
upwards to stay in line with farmer’s larger 
opportunity costs of time and to act as an 
incentive. It may increase the cost of the 
experiment significantly. In France for 
example, this suggests that farmers should 
have average expected earnings of 30 to 50 
€/hour.  
Second, since it is not easy to bring 
participants to the lab, especially farmers, 
experimenters use mobile labs which must 
                                              
12
 Updated figures and list of labs per country are 
available on the Montpellier experimental lab 
website :http://leem.lameta.univ-
montp1.fr/index.php?page=liste_labos&lang=fr 
reconstitute the conditions of a true lab 
(including interactions between participants 
through the computer network, but no oral 
communication between participants). When 
it is difficult to gather several participants 
at the same time and same place, the 
experimentalist can decide to rely on 
strategy methods (see box 4). One should 
therefore add the costs of organisation, 
including the time and transportation costs 
of the experimenters, to the actual 
payments given to participants.  
Box 4: Strategy method questionnaire 
The use of strategy method questionnaires 
can make organisation of a field experiment 
more flexible since they allow conducting 
experiments even when all the subjects do 
not play at the same time. This method 
turns the experiment into an individual 
survey. In such questionnaires, respondents 
are asked to specify what would be their 
decision for each potential strategy that 
could be chosen by the other players. In 
other words, they face a lengthy 
questionnaire instead of playing “in live” 
with other participants. As in most 
experiments, responses are incentivised 
(players can earn a financial reward 
matching their performance in the game) 
but if subjects do not play at the same time, 
then payments must be delayed until the 
other players have completed their 
questionnaire. 
Strategy method can alter behaviour and is 
judged to be less acceptable with non-
student participants (See Brandts and 
Charness (2011) for a review). The 
experimenter thus faces a trade-off: 
strategy method questionnaires provide a 
more complete set of responses and 
simplify the organisational hurdle but 
responses might be less reliable.  
For DCEs, online surveys allow reducing 
costs compared to DCEs organised in the 
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field. Yet online surveys require that lists of 
email address of desired participants are 
available. Online surveys increase the risk of 
selection bias (most likely only younger 
farmers would answer) but recent research 
shows that this risk is declining with the 
improvement of internet access in rural 
areas and the increasing familiarity of 
farmers with new technologies of 
information, as shown by farm census data 
indicating the rapidly growing use of the 
internet by farmers in the EU. 
Budget and time necessary to run RCTs are 
highly variable. They can be fairly low when 
the RCT consists of sending different 
information through an existing newsletter 
to treated groups and non-treated groups to 
observe their reaction to this information. It 
can be very expensive if the RCT aims at 
measuring the impact of a subsidy 
programme targeting the modernisation of 
farm holdings since real payments would 
have to be made to farmers.  
Overall, as emphasised by Haynes et al 
(2012), “with the right academic and policy 
support, [experiments] can be much cheaper 
and simpler to put in place than is often 
supposed. By enabling us to demonstrate 
just how well a policy is working, 
[experiments] can save money in the long 
term - they are a powerful tool to help 
policymakers and practitioners decide which 
of several policies is the most cost effective, 
and also which interventions are not as 
effective as might have been supposed. It is 
especially important in times of shrinking 
public sector budgets to be confident that 
public money is spent on policies shown to 
deliver value for money.” 
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6  Conclusion & Recommendations 
 
This report has provided an overview of the 
usefulness and advantages as well as the 
limitations and challenges of experimental 
approaches as new and complementary tools 
for agricultural policy evaluation.  We conclude 
with a list of six recommendations that result 
from a careful analysis from the literature, the 
discussion during the workshop, and the 
feedback from several DG AGRI policy officers 
(see Acknowledgments). 
6.1 Recommendations to evaluators 
The first set of recommendations is directed 
towards evaluators willing to innovate and 
introduce experimental approaches in their 
research in the field of agricultural policy 
evaluation. The recommendations are 
formulated both with a view to enhance the 
use of experimental approaches in CAP 
evaluations conducted or commissioned by the 
European Commission, but also for the 
evaluation of national or local agricultural 
policies. 
1. Make use of the complementarity of 
methodologies and be open to the use of 
innovative methods 
Although the current tendering process does 
not exclude experimental approaches, 
responses to calls for tender are often biased 
in favour of traditional methods, mostly due to 
path dependency: the pool of companies and 
research units responding to calls for tenders 
in the CAP evaluation domain may implicitly 
assume that the EC is not open to 
experimental approaches and may thus refrain 
from including them in their proposals. Yet, 
policy officers are fully aware of the need for 
the toolbox to evolve. In general, calls for 
tender raise an evaluation question, but leave 
it to the evaluators to propose the best 
method. Evaluators can take advantage of this 
absence of constraints in the methodology in 
most calls for tenders to propose innovative 
methods, including experimental approaches.  
Furthermore, evaluators should further rely on 
a combination of approaches, to take the best 
of all techniques available in the EU evaluation 
tool box, and benefit from the potential 
complementarities between experimental and 
non-experimental methods. For example, 
behavioural parameters or elasticities 
estimated through lab or field experiments can 
be used to improve the parameters of the 
objective function used in simulation models. 
DCEs can also provide estimates of the 
expected adoption rates of rural development 
programmes, a useful parameter to model 
their economic and environmental impacts 
using more complex simulation models. 
Good preparatory desk researches, including 
the use of available statistical data, as well as 
discussions with stakeholders are necessary 
steps in the design of experimental studies. 
Qualitative information is important for the 
selection of the most relevant type of 
experiment and treatment variables. Careful 
analysis of available statistical data is 
necessary to determine the best sampling plan 
and sample size of the experiments. Hence, by 
combining methods, one can exploit the 
complementarity of approaches. 
2. Reconsider the search for 
“representativeness”  
Policy officers generally look for evidence 
general enough to be valid for the entire 
population affected by the policy. Given the 
limitations in sample size and the sampling 
issues involved in experimental studies (see 
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5.1), the representativeness and 
generalizability of the results should be 
discussed in detail (van Bavel, Rodríguez-
Priego, and Maghiros, 2015).  
First, given the high level of internal validity of 
experimental results, their results might still be 
robust enough to make a solid contribution to 
the policy-making process even though they 
may capture behaviour in a specific area only 
(which may or may not be generalizable to 
other contexts), especially when experiments 
are used to complement other methodologies. 
Second, many behavioural findings, replicated 
over time and across domains, can safely be 
assumed to be valid everywhere and at any 
time and can therefore help understand 
reactions to policy of a large share of the EU 
farming population (e.g. evidence of loss 
aversion). Some experimental results can be 
easily extended to a wide range of policy 
issues and contexts and remobilised in other 
evaluation processes. For example, 
experiments to identify efficient designs for 
agri-environmental auctions provide results on 
the acceptability and efficiency of different 
auction formats which are useful in various 
contexts (Cason & Gangadharan, 2005). 
Nevertheless, other behavioural components 
such as sensitivity to social norms are more 
local. When the policy change might be 
affected by behavioural factors which are 
strongly embedded in cultural characteristics, it 
is essential to plan for experiments in different 
Member States. To determine whether a 
behavioural insight is common to everyone or 
is specific to a given cultural setting, one can 
rely on a comparison between a reduced 
number of countries or regions with different 
historical and cultural contexts.  
Repeating experiments in a number of 
different contexts may increase the 
acceptability of experimental results. A careful 
selection of the case study areas and samples 
of participants can help ensure that some of 
the heterogeneity among farmers across EU 
regions is captured. If no country effects are 
identified, results could probably be 
generalised to the EU as a whole (van Bavel, 
Rodríguez-Priego, and Maghiros, 2015). 
3. Proceed by incremental steps: from the 
laboratory to the field. 
Evaluators are encouraged to make use of the 
complementarities between the different 
experimental approaches available and rely on 
a gradual approach: from the lab to the field. 
This gradual approach in the use of economic 
experiments can increase the cost efficiency of 
an evaluation proposal and improve the quality 
of conclusions.  
For example, laboratory experiments are 
typically appropriate methods to pre-test 
individual and group responses to different 
incentives or policy designs. If the policy does 
not work as anticipated in the lab, it is very 
likely to fail in a field application as well (Plott, 
1997). Moreover, different treatments of a lab 
experiment allow comparing several initial 
versions of a policy easily. The experiment 
plays the equivalent role of wind-tunnel testing 
for a newly designed aircraft. Then, as 
emphasised by Hellerstein et al. (2015) from 
USDA’s Economic Research Service, “the next 
logical step after laboratory testing is a field 
test - the equivalent of a test flight”. 
Lab experiments, initially run with students, 
can then be repeated with farmers, in a more 
contextualised setting13; in order to check the 
                                              
13 Running a context-free lab experiment with farmers 
can be difficult. The strict respect of the instructions and 
the acceptance of the incentive payment rule are usually 
harder to obtain than with students. One solution can be 
to move directly from a context-free lab experiment 
with students, to a contextualized field experiment with 
farmers, with words referring to their environment, such 
as their farming practices. This solution helps to improve 
the acceptability of the game and its external validity. 
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sensitivity of outcomes to the context in which 
the policy is applied. In a final step, RCTs can 
be envisaged to confirm results, fine-tune 
implementation and engage a policy dialogue 
with stakeholders and policymakers.  
4. Find responses to moral and ethical 
obstacles associated to randomisation 
All aspects of EU action, including evaluation 
procedures, require that there is no 
discrimination between stakeholders. 
Therefore, when making use of experiments, 
one should make sure to respect this principle. 
As long as experiments do not involve effective 
policy interventions (as is the case for most 
choice, lab and field experiments), this is not a 
problem. Yet, the core element of RCTs is the 
effective implementation of (some aspects of) 
policy measures to only one, randomly 
selected, part of the target population.  
For any experimental research to be 
acceptable within the EU context, a detailed 
description of the approach chosen for 
addressing this issue of non-discrimination 
should therefore be part of the proposal. 
Innovative approaches to randomisation and 
close-to-random procedures, discussed in 
detail in section 5.3 may provide a solution. 
6.2 Recommendations to policy 
officers at the European 
Commission 
We conclude by providing a few institutional 
suggestions that could help develop the use 
and the efficiency of experimental approaches 
for CAP evaluation at the European 
Commission level.  
                                                                         
 
1. Invest in resources and expertise on the 
use of experimental methods for policy 
evaluation 
With respect to the development of policy 
proposals and their ex-ante impact evaluation, 
investing in internal expertise on the use of 
experimental methods would allow spreading 
their use to inform policies at the design 
phase. One example is the newly created ‘Unit 
for Scientific Foresight and Behavioural Insight’ 
of the Joint Research Centre of the EC. 
In 2010, the European Commission set up a 
Framework Contract for the Provision of 
Behavioural Studies (see box 4). Its purpose is 
to facilitate the running of behavioural studies 
by all DGs in support of EU policy-making.  DG 
AGRI could make use of this framework 
contract for experimental studies concerning 
CAP evaluation.  
Box 4: Framework contract for the 
provision of behavioural studies 
In January 2012 the European Commission put 
in place a Framework Contract for the 
provision of behavioural studies, open to all 
services. The Framework Contract considerably 
reduces the administrative workload and the 
timeframe for undertaking specific behavioural 
studies that may support the EC policy agenda. 
The first version of the Framework Contract – 
which will be running until December 2015 – 
has already been mobilised by 10 different 
DGs which, all together, contracted 19 
behavioural studies, focussing on diverse 
issues: from energy labelling to food labelling, 
from online gambling to the use of credit 
cards  for purchases, to name but a few. From 
January 2016, the current Framework Contract 
will be replaced by a new and improved 
version. 
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2. Inform evaluators on the potential of 
experimental approaches and openness 
towards the use of these new methods 
Informing external contractors on the 
advantages and limitations of experimental 
approaches for policy-making could help raise 
awareness of the potential of these new 
methods and could demonstrate DG AGRI’s 
openness towards the use of these methods in 
future evaluation contracts. Also, Member 
States could be informed of the potential of 
experimental approaches, for example with 
respect to the evaluation of nationally 
implemented rural development policies. 
Moreover, informing evaluators of the 
procedure for authorisation of pilot tests and 
randomisation by the EC services would allow 
evaluators to take into account the constraints 
associated to these procedures and may 
encourage the setting up of RCTs.  
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Annex 1: Workshop agenda  
How can economic experiments inform EU agricultural policy? Considerations for 
CAP 2014-2020 evaluation 
Date: 8 January 2015 14h-18h  
Place: DG AGRI AP L130 11 S.1 
  
14h-14h20: Introduction (Marianne Lefebvre ) 
14h20-14h40: What are the drivers of farmers' responses to agricultural policy? (Sophie 
Thoyer) 
14h40-16h: Presentation of different experimental approaches and examples of economic 
experiments relevant for CAP evaluation (Uwe Latacz-Lohmann) 
16h20-17h05: Value added and limitations of experimental approaches compared to other 
methodologies currently in use in designing and evaluating the CAP (Raphaële Préget) 
Complementarities between simulation models and experimental approaches for 
policy design (Discussion by Koen Dillen) 
The limitations in current CAP evaluation toolbox (Discussion by Anette Hurrelmann) 
17h05-17h20: Running experiments for DG SANCO: sharing experiences (Emanuele Ciriolo) 
17h20-17h50: Practical limitations and recommendations to facilitate experimentation in 
the CAP (Sophie Thoyer) 
17h50-18h: Conclusion (Sergio Gomez y Paloma) 
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